

M A N A G E M E N T   S T A F F   S T U D I E S

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Regional Divisions

National Intelligence Survey Division

Map Division

Publications Division

Administrative Staff

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP57-00042A000100150001-2

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MANAGEMENT STAFF STUDY OF THE REGIONAL DIVISIONS  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Findings:

The competence of the regional divisions of the Office of Reports and Estimates is contingent on:

1. Promulgation of policy which will define a production plan, responsibilities of the regional divisions to engage in basic intelligence research, and the responsibilities of the regional divisions for coordination of national intelligence. (See Tabs 1, 2, 2A, and 3.)
2. Provision of a requirements organization which will insure speedy but coordinated action on CIA requirements for information. (See Tab 2C.)
3. Integration of CIA activities with clarification of the support responsibilities of one component to another. (See Tabs 1, 2, and 2A.)
4. Augmented and improved collection support. (See Tabs 2E, 2F, 2H, and 2G.)
5. Internal realignment of functions, organization, staffing, and procedures of the Office of Reports and Estimates; provision of orientation and guidance for the regional analysts. (See Tabs 2, 3, and 4.)

Recommendations:

The combined resources of the Office of Reports and Estimates, of the Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff, and of the Management Staff should be directed toward the objectives listed above. Specific suggestions of the Management Staff for improvement of the operations of the regional divisions of the Office of Reports and Estimates are contained in Tab 2. The Management Staff recommendations for organizational and functional changes are contained in Tab 2D, while additional suggestions for improvement of the requirement activity are contained in Tab 2C. Recommendations and plans for improvements offered by the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, by Chief, Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff, and by Assistant Director for Operations are contained in Tabs 3, 4, and 5, respectively.

Basic Documents Relating to the Study:

Tab 1 - Summary of the Management Study.

Tab 2 - The Management Study with Attachments A through H.

Tab 3 - Comments of the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates on the Study.

Tab 4 - Comments of the Chief, Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff on the Study.

Tab 5 - Comments of the Assistant Director for Operations on Attachments E and F

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Executive

DATE: JUL 14 1950

FROM : Management Officer

SUBJECT: Management Staff Study of Regional Divisions of Office of Reports and Estimates

1. A four-month Management Staff study of ORE Regional Divisions disclosed conclusive evidence of the need for definitive clarification of authorities and responsibilities delegated to CIA for the coordination and production of national intelligence. The policy actions required relate to the following major problems:

a. Definition of the Program of CIA and, More Specifically of its Major Production Components, ORE and OSI. This clarification of program should provide for:

(1) Agency-level determination of a comprehensive production plan for the production and coordination of national intelligence, with both long-range and short-term objectives and with specification of CIA responsibilities in relationship to those of the other intelligence agencies of the Federal Government.

(2) Clarification of responsibilities for basic research support within the intelligence community, such assignment being practically related to the needs of the users of this support and to the budgetary and staffing resources for this basic research activity within the designated supplying agencies.

b. Definition of Authorities and Responsibilities Assigned to CIA for the Coordination of National Intelligence. Is CIA to be a true coordinator, or is its product to remain the object of coordination exercised by the other intelligence agencies? CIA's responsibilities and its authority to coordinate (Does coordination include direction?) each phase of the intelligence process (i.e., the planning, the collection, the production, the reconciliation of substantive disagreements, and the issuance of national intelligence) should be specifically defined.

c. Development of Policies and Procedures to Insure Speedy, but Coordinated, Action on CIA Requirements for Information. This problem is described in detail in my memorandum to Chief, COAPS, dated 25 May 1950. Management Staff recommendations are contained in my memorandum to you, dated 3 July 1950, entitled, "Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions".

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d. Integration of CIA Activities. In the interests of economy and efficiency, duplication of activity within CIA must be kept to a minimum. The support functions of each of the CIA components to each other must be clearly stated. This is particularly needed since the activation of OPC. The operational program of OPC introduces need for support which does not specifically fall within the intelligence mission of the Agency.

e. Internal Realignment of ORE Functions, Organization, Staffing, and Procedures. Provision should be made for:

- (1) Direction of ORE effort toward primary responsibilities.
- (2) Facilitation of internal coordination of its intelligence activities.
- (3) Guidance to analysts on best methods and techniques to be employed in intelligence analysis.

2. The findings and recommendations resulting from this Management Staff study of ORE Regional Divisions are attached for your information and such action as may be required in the solution of the problems indicated and in the implementation of recommendations for improvement. The full report is contained in action memoranda to responsible officials, as follows:

a. Memorandum to AD/ORE, entitled, "Management Study of Regional Divisions of ORE".

b. TAB A - Memorandum to AD/ORE, entitled, "Factors to be Reconciled Between the NIS Program and the Basic Economic Research Activity of Eastern Europe Division, ORE".

c. TAB B - Memorandum to AD/ORE, entitled, "Reaction of D/NEA to NIS studies".

d. TAB C - Memorandum to Chief, COAPS, entitled, "Information Requirements".

e. TAB D - Memorandum to Executive, entitled, "Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions".

f. TAB E - Memorandum to Chief, COAPS, et. al., entitled, "Suggestions for Improvement of Collection Facilities Resulting from Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI".

g. TAB F - Memorandum to AD/OO, entitled, "Suggestions for Improvement of OO Service Resulting from Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI".

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h. TAB G - Memorandum to AD/OSO, entitled, "Suggestions for Improvement of the OSO Collection Service Resulting from Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI".

i. TAB H - Memorandum to AD/OCD, entitled, "Suggestions for Improvement of OCD Service Resulting From Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI".

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cc - AD/ORE  
Chief, COAPS  
Budget Officer

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July 14, 1950

Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

Management Officer

Management Study of Regional Divisions of ORE

1. Findings of the Management team resulting from a survey of ORE regional divisions during the past four months, which are indicative of possible improvements in ORE operations, follow under the six activity headings indicated in the succeeding paragraphs. Some of the findings which have been discussed verbally with you or members of your staff are repeated for purposes of clarification and integration. Since this report is limited to those findings which indicate need for improvement in the ORE production effort, it should be read with the knowledge that ORE has developed, within the past three years, into a full-fledged intelligence production component of the Federal government with a potential for achieving distinction in the intelligence community. It has recruited, trained, and developed an outstanding corps of intelligence specialists. It has consolidated existing intelligence data into firm integrated intelligence summaries which are being currently maintained. ORE officials and analysts deserve recognition for these achievements.

## 2. Production

### a. Findings

(1) The ORE regional analysts were practically unanimous in expressing a desire for more specific direction of the production effort. The kinds of direction desired can be discerned from a review of the following typical comments:

(a) What intelligence does the Director need to be personally cognizant of the world situation? In what form and how frequently does he wish this intelligence?

(b) Who are the "policy makers" to whom the product is directed? What are their particular needs, their capabilities to study the situation, or their idiosyncrasies which must be taken into account at time of production?

(c) It would be most helpful to know the identity of a particular requester, the manner in which he intends to use the intelligence, and the organizational level at which the intelligence will be used.

(d) What are the support responsibilities of ORE? for basic research? to working levels of other intelligence agencies? to OPC and OSO for operational as opposed to intelligence support? to OGD for completeness of the Library and Registers? to non-intelligence agencies of the government?

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(e) How much production assistance can ORE expect from the other intelligence agencies? Can ORE assign production studies to the other intelligence agencies? If so, how can it insure compliance? How far can ORE go in duplication of activities of the other intelligence agencies? in plugging intelligence gaps resulting from the inertia, lack of staff, or incompetence of other intelligence agencies?

(f) Should ORE report instances where implementation of U.S. policy endangers US national security? or where U.S. activity abroad deviates from U.S. policy to the detriment of U.S. national security?

(g) How fully should an intelligence report or estimate be documented? Should meaningful comparisons be included? Should documentation be included in the report, in an appendix, or retained in division files?

(h) What factors influence presentation of an estimate as a weekly item, as an Intelligence Memorandum, as an ORE? Under what circumstances should an estimate be coordinated with the intelligence agencies represented on the IAC?

(2) Coordination, substantive review, and editing appears to consume a disproportionate share of ORE production effort. Also, each additional handling adds a day or more to the production-processing which may detract from the current value of the estimate. Moreover, the total process discourages the analyst and tends to dull his enthusiasm and initiative. This criticism was leveled at each of the three levels of coordination and review, namely intra-divisional, inter-divisional, and inter-agency. Typical complaints expressed by analysts are:

(a) Division review is time-consuming and may result in publication of estimates in which the originating analyst does not concur. (This is particularly true of one division where nine internal reviews are made prior to submission to D/Pub).

(b) Few criteria or guides exist to which the analyst may turn for help in writing an acceptable first draft. Criteria as to style, format, language, punctuation, and substantive coverage are needed. The analyst is not told "why" his draft was not acceptable so that he may correct his errors and develop his drafting skill to a point where he can produce intelligence which can be published as is.

(c) It is impossible to get a firm answer to drafting questions of even minor importance, e.g., Should Satellite (satellite) be capitalized? Each reviewer exercises his own judgment.

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(d) Each reviewer or editor feels it his duty to rewrite the paper. This, in turn, usually results in a second rewrite by the originating analyst.

(e) Desk analysts feel that editorial and functional reviews often exceed the jurisdiction of the reviewer.

(f) Considerable analyst time is consumed in educating the reviewer and adds little or nothing to the quality of the estimate.

(g) D/Pub tendency to exploit the news value of the report and to achieve brevity impairs the factual and intelligence integrity of the estimate.

(h) While D/Pub is functionally responsible for assignment and coordination of production action, the regional divisions report that production requests are also received from Global Survey Division, from International Organization Division, from Economic Division, and from other regional and functional divisions of ORE, without prior coordination with D/Pub. The divisions are most happy to comply with all such requests and generally do without protest. However, such action places a severe workload strain on the regional divisions and disrupts normal production activity.

(i) Clearance of estimates with agencies represented on the IAC is unduly lengthy and time-consuming. In many instances reports have been rewritten twice to bring them up-to-date during the six to eighteen months taken for such clearance. Informal agreement reached at the working level is often nullified at time of formal coordination by higher echelons of the coordinating agency. In some instances, exception is taken to an estimate purely on the grounds that the coordinating agency does not have enough knowledge of the situation to concur. In other instances, rhetorical, rather than substantive issues, consume valuable coordination time.

(3) Little thought has been given by regional analysts to methods employed in intelligence evaluation and estimating.

(a) Checks on the accuracy of estimates have been achieved through coordinating with interested regional and functional analysts of other desks and divisions and through substantive review by Intelligence Control. (It might be parenthetically stated that the effectiveness of Intelligence Control varied considerably, such variance being contingent on the proximity of the control officer to the area picture, on the analytical and substantive

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competence of the Control Officer, and on the strength and objectivity of the Division Chief in his role of arbitrator.) Little or no thought has been given in the regional divisions to development of objective checks on estimates through scientific methods such as content analysis, which might confirm or question estimates based on impressions.

(b) Also, little attention has been given to determining the best methods for daily analysis of the incoming information and subsequent indoctrination of analysts in the accepted methodology. While it is recognized that considerable freedom must be enjoyed by the analysts to compensate for human differences, the survey disclosed sufficient evidence to indicate that this phase of the intelligence operation could be improved. The survey disclosed that three unrelated ORE actions have forced method changes which have a seemingly beneficial effect. First, ORE administrative injunction on size of files has forced considerable consolidation of information. Secondly, the preparation of the situation reports forced consolidation of information and the preparation of a synthesized current picture of the area in question. Thirdly, the working paper maintains on a current basis the intelligence picture drawn together in a situation report. It was further noted during the survey that a direct relationship existed between the competence of area coverage and degree of selectivity employed in retention of information in the analysts' files. Smaller files generally paralleled fuller evaluation and synthesis of the intelligence on the area.

(4) The working paper has emerged as a palliative agent for the problems presented in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3), above. With the working paper, the Division could establish policies, where none existed; it could exempt itself from prescribed coordination; and, it provided a means for organizing the mountains of heterogeneous data received daily. The working paper has been most useful and helpful to ORE. It has presented a plan for consolidation of data, it has given the untried intelligence analysts an experimental area in which to become oriented, to develop and to practice and improve their skills in intelligence analysis, evaluation, and presentation. The questions now arise as to whether:

- (a) the usefulness of the working paper is declining?
- (b) its existence obscures the more vital task of producing high-level national intelligence?
- (c) the intelligence contained in the working paper is sufficiently utilized to justify the effort expended?

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(5) A close relationship appears to exist between ORE divisional breakdown and the subject-matter coverage of intelligence estimates. In some instances the reflection of organizational jurisdiction in estimates has adversely affected the completeness of the estimate, e.g., a critical situation arising in one area may be reported by that area specialist and the significance of the action to affairs of that area and to U.S. security will be indicated, with no mention being made of the significance of that action on other areas of the world. Analysts frankly admitted that outlines for estimates were designed to eliminate need for coordination with other divisions. Also, in the preparation of daily and weekly items, care was taken to confine reporting and estimating to their own areas and to those other areas where cordial and cooperative relationships existed.

(6) ORE intelligence on the Soviet and its relationships with the rest of the world has probably been more severely restricted by organizational influence than the intelligence on the non-Soviet areas. Responsibility for reporting Soviet intent has been placed with D/EE, while responsibility for estimating Soviet capabilities for other than Russia proper and the Satellites has been placed in the other ORE regional divisions. EE analysts feel they cannot fulfill their responsibilities properly without maintaining cognizance over capabilities of other areas. Thus, one finds in D/EE a group of analysts assigned on a world-wide area breakdown for duplicate coverage of the rest of the world. It can also be stated that this dispersion of effort within EE leaves the total coverage of Russia proper to one analyst, which would appear to be insufficient coverage. At time of production, when Soviet influences or intents are being appraised, a deadlock can easily develop between D/EE and another regional division as to jurisdictional prerogatives. In some cases, estimates are killed because issues cannot be resolved. This situation is particularly acute in the areas of recent communist control, such as China and Eastern Germany. The analysts of EE advance one logical argument for their encroachment on responsibilities of other areas, namely, the situation must be presented from a Soviet viewpoint, which is not present in the other divisions. Until these jurisdictional questions are settled, incomplete estimates will continue to be published, many required estimates will be killed prior to publication, and valuable production effort will be wasted in futile haggling between divisions.

(7) Intelligence coverage of Africa represents another serious division of responsibility. The African Branch of D/NEA is concerned with only the economic aspects and phases of intelligence activity and intelligence production. Political aspects for these countries under the jurisdiction of the African Branch are handled by the country whose decisive policies govern colonies within the continent of Africa i.e. the Portuguese colonies governed by the country of Portugal within the Western European Division and the British colonies whose activities are governed by the Northern Division.

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(8) A wide variance was noted in the amount of pressure exerted in different regional divisions for intelligence production. The analysts of Latin-America Division admitted that they would welcome more requests for intelligence and would enjoy working under more pressure. On the other hand, analysts of EE/Econ Branch were putting in many hours of voluntary overtime to meet the continuous pressure of deadlines and requests. There appears to be need for equalizing these production pressures through functional or organizational adjustments.

b. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

(1) ORE policy together with implementing procedures be developed, in conjunction with COAPS when necessary, to clarify:

(a) Substantive content of estimates in relationship to user, production vehicle to be employed, documentation desired, and other content obscurities.

(b) Support functions of ORE regional divisions.

(c) Relationships with agencies represented on the IAC.

(2) Production control, coordination and review responsibilities be clearly defined, established, and enforced. A style manual presenting ORE policy on style, format, language, punctuation, and substantive coverage be prepared for use by all ORE analysts and editors. A training program be established which will facilitate the initial production of intelligence sufficiently finished to permit immediate publication and thereby eliminate the present practice which condones the rewriting of the intelligence by editorial specialists.

(3) Research and experimentation be conducted within ORE, with regional division participation, to develop and to utilize, new and improved techniques and methods for:

(a) Checking the validity of intelligence estimates.

(b) Evaluating and integrating the daily incoming volume of information into meaningful intelligence.

(4) In conjunction with recommendation (3) (b), above, the position of the working paper in the ORE production effort be defined in terms of:

(a) amount of time to be employed in this type of production

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(b) purposes of the paper

(c) manner in which the paper will be used.

(5) The functions, organization and procedures of ORE regional and functional divisions be redefined to:

(a) provide ease of coordination within ORE

(b) insure completeness of estimates

(c) relate organization and staffing to national security needs

(d) equalize production workload among producing components.

c. Comment: The proposal of interested ORE officials that ORE organization, functions, and program be reoriented to the present-day world situation appears to have considerable merit and might greatly enhance ORE's production activity. It is recommended that a plan reflecting this proposal be drafted immediately for discussion with the Executive, COAPS, and possibly the Director. The Management Staff will render any assistance you may desire in drafting the plan.

### 3. Basic Research

#### a. Findings

(1) Wide variance was found in the amount of basic research being conducted within the regional divisions of ORE. D/WE carefully refrains from any type of basic research. D/LA and D/NEA believe they must continue to engage in basic research to about the same extent as is presented in the Situation Reports, while Eastern Europe is engaged in full-scale basic economic research. There appeared to be unanimous expression of need for basic research facilities. Presently, the ORE regional analysts are unable to rely on State Department and other governmental basic research facilities because:

(a) ORE analysts have no directive power to insure acceptance of projects by these agencies or, if accepted, that they will comply with the request within necessary deadlines.

(b) These agencies do not have sufficient staff for the intensive coverage required by ORE.

(c) These agencies do not have access to all the intelligence materials available to ORE so are not able to present as accurate a picture as ORE might desire.

(2) The NIS program has not been designed for ORE regional needs and the absence of coordination between the NIS and ORE regional divisions has vitiated the usefulness of this product. A discussion of the unreconciled factors between basic economic intelligence coverage of D/EE and the NIS program is attached as Tab A. Moreover, the NIS studies thus far completed have been found by ORE regional analysts, to contain inaccuracies and to be incomplete. A discussion of D/NEA reaction to the NIS studies covering its area is attached as Tab B.

(3) If production requests levelled on D/EE for intelligence on Soviet economy are to be accepted, ORE has no alternative but to support a fairly large basic economic research activity for coverage of the Soviet economy.

b. Recommendations It is recommended that:

(1) A plan be drafted whereby NSC authorization will be provided for the basic economic intelligence activity now underway in D/EE.

(2) The basic economic coverage of the Soviet include all areas under Soviet influence which contribute to the Soviet economic potential and all such activity be in one organization to obtain full utilization of industrial specialists. (Note - During the course of the survey, a proposal for including coverage of China and Eastern Germany in D/EE economic branch activity was presented to Chief, D/WE, and Chief, D/FE.)

(3) COAPS intercession be requested to obtain better service from OIR of State Department on basic research requirements, and greater effort be expended to utilize the facilities of the Department of Defense.

(4) The facilities of other non-intelligence government agencies be employed to assist in providing basic research. Where reimbursement is required, the project be submitted to the Project Review Committee. (Note - It was suggested during the survey that a project be formalized to utilize foreign trade statistics maintained by the Department of Commerce.)

(5) The facilities of OCD Registers be more fully developed by coordinated effort between OCD and ORE for purposes of maintaining and supplying basic intelligence data. Also machine method facilities of OCD be employed more fully for centralization of basic statistical data.

(6) Action be taken to provide access to the files of NIS contributors for ORE regional analysts.

(7) The facilities of the External Research Program be more fully employed to provide basic intelligence data.



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4. Requirements

a. Since the problems relating to this activity are inter- and intra-agency in scope, the survey findings are contained in a memorandum to Chief, COAPS, attached as Tab C. Management Staff recommendations are contained in a "Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions", dated 3 July 1950, attached as Tab D.

b. The analysts generally indicated that the ORE Requirements Staff emphasized its "control" function and appeared to be more of an obstructing than a facilitating agent in servicing their information needs. It is suggested that the Requirements Staff reach a closer understanding with ORE regional analysts so that its assistance will be recognized as such.

5. Collection

a. Findings

(1) Survey findings and recommendations relating to the collection of information are contained in three memoranda addressed to Chief, COAPS, to AD/OO and to AD/OSO and attached as Tabs E, F, and G respectively. Also attached as Tab H is a memorandum addressed to AD/OCD containing survey findings on OCD service to ORE regional divisions.

(2) The adequacy of collector's fulfillment of ORE needs was largely contingent on the informal coordination existing between ORE desk analysts and the appropriate collector's area specialists. All analysts heartily endorsed efforts made within the past six months to establish coordination between

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(4) The one collection service under the cognizance of ORE, namely, presentation of U.S. returning officials, while most fruitful in some instances, was regarded to be of marginal value in many cases. The analysts felt the greatest value derived from such presentations is the opinions offered by the official on critical situations. Such opinions are generally offered only at small informal gatherings.

(5) The curtailment of foreign newspapers for budgetary reasons was cited in some cases as seriously curtailing the information available to the analysts. (Management will investigate.)

b. Recommendations It is recommended that:

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(1) ORE officials cooperate with officials of COAPS, OO, OSO, and OCD in evaluating and implementing suggestions of ORE analysts for improved collection support from other offices and agencies.

(2) The efforts taken to strengthen relationships between ORE desk analysts and area specialists of OSO-OO be continued. (Note - Closer coordination between D/WE and OO/C was initiated as a result of a survey suggestion.)

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(3) Steps be taken to provide for economic coverage by including one or more positions [redacted] for the collection of scientific information; or that other arrangements for adequate economic coverage of DPs and other refugees be made. (Effected 14 July 1950.)

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(4) The following suggestions for enhancing the presentation activity be evaluated and implemented, if feasible.

(a) Provide more data on the speaker, such as his specializations, and an evaluation of his effectiveness, as indicated by reports he has submitted and the personal knowledge of analysts.

(b) Arrange for a greater number of small specialized gatherings and a fewer number of large general presentations.

(c) Provide transcripts of presentations to interested analysts, when so requested.

(d) Make provision for debriefing ORE analysts who are sent abroad on official business.

(5) Request adequate budgetary provision for purchase of foreign newspapers and other materials when analysts express real need and are capable of handling the language without translator assistance.

(6) Provide a procedure whereby desk analysts will be alerted to watch for new sources of information and whereby adequate follow-up of such suggestions will be provided.

6. Information Control and Reference Activity

a. Findings

(1) The volume of information routed to desk analysts each day is constantly increasing. Scanning, annotating and filing these materials absorb a considerable portion of the analysts' working day. The problem of handling these materials more expeditiously will become more critical as more materials are received with no further increase in staff.

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(2) Varying degrees of selectivity in determining value of documents were encountered at the control or distribution points prior to receipt of information materials by the desk analyst.

(3) Channeling requests for inter-library loan through both division and ORE information controls resulted in duplicate workload and delay in receipt of requested materials by the analysts. Also, channeling requirements through division information control resulted in duplicate workload and in delays in receipt of requested materials.

(4) Several of the Division Information Control Sections maintained two document locator files arranged by control number and by area. In most cases only one of the files was utilized for reference purposes. Also like locator information is maintained by OCD.

(5) The size of files maintained by analysts varied considerably from division to division. ORE direction to keep files to a minimum has to a large extent been well received by the analysts and they are for, the most part, complying with the directive. Large files were maintained by desk analysts who:

- (a) were comparatively new to the organization
- (b) had recently initiated coverage of a new area
- (c) had a situation report to complete.

(6) Instances of unnecessarily large files noted during the survey were reported to Branch and Division Chiefs for corrective action.

b. Recommendations It is recommended that:

(1) The plan for integrating ORE information control activity with OCD dissemination and distribution activity presented in memorandum to AD/ORE, dated 29 November 1949 be implemented.

(2) After implementation of plan described in (1), above, arrangements be made with OCD to determine to what extent OCD readers can be selective in screening out materials of marginal or no intelligence interest to ORE desk analysts, thereby reducing the volume of materials received by desk analysts. (Note - During course of the survey an experiment was initiated whereby OCD readers would select, in accordance with specific requirements, materials to be forwarded to the International Communism Section of D/EE. D/EE evaluation at the end of the months' experiment should determine if OCD selection would be of benefit to this D/EE activity and the competence of OCD readers to disseminate to ORE Divisions.)

(3) Only one document locator file be maintained in each Division Information Control Section.

(4) The limitation placed on analyst files being maintained in ORE be continued and the desk analysts be encouraged to rely more heavily on OCD reference facilities, and to provide OCD with continuous advice on services and materials desired.

7. Administrative Considerations

a. Findings

(1) Pending action on an over-all ORE reorganization, recommended in paragraph 2b(4), above, certain T/O adjustments are required within D/EE and D/NEA.

(2) The area analysts indicated that they felt their efforts were not of interest to or appreciated by Agency top management.

(3) Likewise, they indicated that their opinions were not solicited as to administrative policy and procedures within ORE when such action concerned their working effort or welfare.

(4) The analysts expressed a need for Agency assistance and facilities to promote their professional growth, maturity, and competence.

(5) To assist them in their work, the analysts felt need for greater freedom to consult with specialists within all parts of the Federal Government, for greater knowledge of technical skills existing within CIA, and for access to security-cleared consultants outside the Federal Government.

(6) Provision of some office accessories, normally authorized for Federal Government use, such as telephone books, and improvement of office working facilities would be welcomed by many of the analysts.

b. Recommendations It is recommended that:

(1) T/O adjustments in D/EE and D/NEA be worked out with Management Staff.

(2) The AD/ORE take appropriate action to persuade the Director of Central Intelligence, the Executive, members of COAPS, and other policy-making officials of the Agency to confer with the ORE regional division analysts periodically. Also insure that appropriate comments of the Director and other Agency policy-makers on particular ORE intelligence be communicated to all interested analysts.

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(3) the Members of the Plans and Policy Staff be instructed to solicit opinions, not only of Division Chiefs, but of the interested area analysts, prior to development of ORE plans, policies, and procedures.

(4) Steps be taken within ORE to request appropriate Agency action to provide for ORE analysts:

(a) foreign language classes .

(b) foreign travel or foreign assignment by ORE-OSO exchange

(c) trips to American industry

(d) indoctrination in organization and facilities of the Agency.

(5) Procedures be established, through appropriate Agency channels, to provide for ORE official:

(a) listings of technical skills of CIA personnel

(b) listings of technical specialists in other agencies of the Federal Government who may be available for consultation.

(c) listings of security-cleared consultants from outside the Federal Government.

(d) permission to consult with the specialists listed in (a), (b), and (c), above.

(6) Arrangements be made:

(a) to provide CIA telephone directories to the analysts who express need for them

(b) to provide wall clocks in the ORE working offices

(c) to consider, when the present space crisis is over, the needs of certain analysts for greater privacy when conferring or drafting. Possibly, the provision of two or three partitioned cubby-holes, such as reading rooms provided graduate students in university libraries, per division might be practical. Also, explore the possibility of obtaining, through procurement channels, glass enclosed office units, recently placed on the market.

/s/

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TAB A

July 14, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

FROM: Management Officer

SUBJECT: Factors to be reconciled between NIS program and basic economic research activity of Eastern Europe Division, ORE

1. A complete and reliable body of knowledge of basic statistics and data on Russian and Orbit economy presently is nonexistent. Policy planning bodies such as Joint Chiefs have continuous need for such information, broken down by industry and commodity.

2. The western nations generally publish this type of information in public documents such as almanacs and yearbooks. The data needed for United States foreign activities is compiled and maintained in agencies having the primary interest such as Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and Interior. The primary use for these data is United States foreign trade and finance. OIR of State Department has primary responsibility for maintaining the data required for intelligence operations.

3. The situation concerning Russia and Satellites is quite different in all respects. The data is not publically issued which requires employment of intelligence collection and production techniques to arrive at complete and reliable answers. The primary needs for these data on the Soviet are: (1) waging a cold war; (2) ascertaining Soviet capabilities and intentions regarding a "shooting" war.

4. While some information on basic Soviet economy is maintained in Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Defense, and particularly OIR of State Department, the coverage is specialized, incomplete because of lack of staff, and unreliable in these agencies denied access to classified information. To remedy this situation within CIA, an Economic Branch with approximately fifty positions was established in Eastern Europe Division.

5. However, by NSCID 3, CIA is also charged with the responsibility for coordinating and reviewing National Intelligence Surveys being produced outside of CIA, which would present basic intelligence on all areas of the world. Thus, basic economic data on the Soviet is being compiled and published by another ORE component.

6. To date, no effort has been made to join the two efforts. It would appear that close coordination of these two activities would be mutually beneficial and duplication of effort could be drastically reduced. Examples of the cleavage between these activities are:

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a. The analysts of Eastern Europe Division have never seen and have no knowledge of the NIS outline. There is no assurance that the completed NIS will be of any use to Economic Branch, Eastern Europe Division.

b. No attempt has been made to standardize economic values used, such as bases, criteria, statistical formula. Thus, we may have contradictory basic intelligence emanating from CIA.

c. The analysts of Eastern Europe Division have not been consulted as to priority of production assignment of NIS sections.

d. The analysts of Eastern Europe Division have never been informed as to what agencies of the government are participating in the NIS program or their areas of responsibility so they are not able to avail themselves of the effort being expended in economic study of the Orbit.

e. NIS participants of other agencies have informally approached Eastern Europe Division requesting assistance such as:

- (1) Access to FDD holdings.
- (2) Access to EE files.
- (3) EE opinion and advice on their projects.

f. Pre-publication drafts of NIS sections are not made available to Eastern Europe Division analysts for reference. A draft is forwarded to Eastern Europe Division for review but must be returned to NIS Division within stated time limitations.

g. No action has been taken to authorize Eastern Europe Division utilization of data being compiled in other agencies for purposes of keeping issued sections of the NIS current by periodic revisions of such sections.

7. Consideration should be given to institution of procedures for coordination of these two basic economic intelligence efforts. Such action would eliminate costly duplication of effort within the Federal Government and would enhance the quality of the intelligence product. Feasible procedural changes are:

a. Review of NIS outline by Eastern Europe Division economic specialists to ensure complete coverage and to indicate priority of activity to be undertaken in other agencies from standpoint of need within Eastern Europe Division.

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b. Arrangements to permit continuous liaison with NIS producers and Eastern Europe Division so that data may be freely exchanged and work effort may be integrated.

c. Definition of channels and priorities for utilization of CIA services of common interest to both groups. These CIA services include FDD and OCD.

d. Assignment of production of basic economic intelligence of Soviet to Eastern Europe Division.

8. Many of the above listed discrepancies are equally applicable to other divisions of ORE but are not as serious since it does not involve complete duplication of activity.

/s/

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TAB B

July 14, 1950

Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

Management Officer

Discussion of D/NEA reaction to the NIS Studies Covering this  
Regional Area

1. Many hours of production analysts' time have been allocated to the correction of basic research materials submitted through NIS channels by Chapter contributors to D/NIS and referred by D/NIS to ORE regional divisions for comment. These comments include correction of errors and detection of inaccuracies, omissions, and fallacious statements contained in the basic drafts.

2. Despite the effort expended by the intelligence analysts within the responsible ORE area to correct contributors' drafts, it appears that D/NIS has often disregarded the efforts of these regional analysts. In these cases, D/NIS has two stories and needs only one correct answer. The question arises as to who is correct, the contributor or the ORE regional analyst? This seeming disregard of ORE regional comment may in large part be attributable to the fact that once the basic research has been performed within the Agency having responsibility for the contribution, D/NIS is unable to gain acceptance of errors and inaccuracies pointed out by ORE analysts.

3. Comments of ORE area specialists in D/NEA indicate that materials used for basic research by Chapter contributors are limited to those immediately at hand and little or no effort is expended in exploiting source material available locally through other agencies or available through field action.

4. It appeared to us that the D/NIS attitude is that errors in these publications will reflect on the Chapter contributors and not on CIA. This attitude is not shared by the Management Staff. On the contrary, it is our experience that many responsible Agency officials feel that this is a CIA publication. Credit or criticism of the publication will fall on CIA and not on the Chapter contributors.

5. We have checked these complaints with the Chief and editors in D/NIS. They indicated that they are aware of these difficulties and are taking steps to rectify existing situations. It appears that a further check should be made with D/NEA analysts six months hence to determine if corrective action has been taken by D/NIS.

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TAB C

Chief, COAPS

25 May 1950

Management Officer

Information Requirements

1. On 12 April 1950, the Acting Executive requested that I re-examine the requirements and collection directive situation in coordination with your staff, submitting recommendations, fully documented.
2. Pertinent facts relating to this problem obtained through surveys of OCD, ORE and OSI are presented in the attached study together with suggestions of analysts of ORE and OSI for improvement of the present situation. To permit you to review the problem objectively, recommendations of this office are not included.
3. It is suggested that, after you have reviewed the attached study, we hold an informal conference at which the merits of the suggestions of the ORE-OSI analysts can be discussed and at which we can develop for the Acting Executive coordinated recommendations relating to improvement of the present situation. At this time Management could have AD/ORE and AD/OSI concur in the statements made in this study if documentation is desired.

/s/

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Att: Study

## INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

1. Present Agency policy sets forth a formal procedure for the processing of information requirements. The role of the principal participants follows:

a. The production analyst - The need for the information is identified and formulated. The need usually arises either from the receipt of an information report which suggests possible changes in the current situation or from initiation of a production paper, the completion of which is contingent on further information. The formulated need and suggestions for source assignment are incorporated into a tentative request for action by the ORE or OSI requirements staff. In ORE the request is channeled through a division information control unit for establishment of controls. In both offices, the requirement usually has the official concurrence of the division chief.

b. The ORE/OSI Requirements Staff - The request is examined at this point for determination as to coordination required within the other divisions of both production offices and this coordination is effected. Also the request is examined to determine:

- (1) If documented information on hand may satisfy the request.
- (2) If the request duplicates requirements outstanding.
- (3) If time limitations are reasonable.
- (4) If the information requested is within the functional and organizational sphere of the requestor.
- (5) If the information requested is of such a kind that the collector can be expected to respond., e.g., Only questions "of fact" are accepted; questions "of mind" are excluded.

When the above determinations have been made, the requirement is redrafted, a ditto master is prepared and the requirement is transmitted to OCD.

c. Liaison Division, OCD - The activity of the Production Offices' Requirement Staffs is duplicated here in relationship to other offices of CIA and to the IAC agencies. The collection source is determined, with consideration being given to suggestions of the production analyst and the Production Office Requirements Staff. A collection directive is prepared, attached to ditto copies of the requirement and dispatched to the collection agency.

d. Collection Agency - The collection agency carries on from here determining methods and facilities to be employed. It should be noted that the collection agency may refuse to accept the requirement and may do so without justifying its action. In the case of State Department, the requirement must first be reviewed and in some cases redrafted by the OIR desk, prior to receipt by the policy desk for collection action.

e. Authorized deviations from the formal procedure - 1/

(1) The "P&P" procedure - OO/C's pressing need for requirements two years ago resulted in installation of a procedure whereby OO/C directly requests requirements from ORE-OSI when it has travellers going to foreign points. The requirements resulting from the request are transmitted directly back to OO/C with OCD receiving an information copy for subsequent dissemination of reports resulting from the requirements. ORE analysts, ORE Requirements Staff, and OO/HdQRS. have all expressed the belief that this procedure may not be necessary if liaison contact were established between OO/C and ORE-OSI analysts. It would appear considerable savings in processing time by all participants could be achieved if this procedure were discontinued.

(2) Presentations - Information requirements formulated for interrogation of US Government Officials returning to this country are prepared by the production analysts of ORE and OSI and are transmitted directly to the Presentation Branch of the Administrative Staff, ORE, who arranges for the presentation.

(3) Scientific requirements - OCD has relinquished its assigned function for final coordination of all scientific requirements to OSI. Presently, the bulk of scientific requirements are generated in the SIC and its sub-committees. In the case of a scientific requirement originating outside the SIC, such as one from OPC or OSO, OCD sends the requirement to OSI for final coordination.

f. Confusions existing in the present organization -

(1) Responsibility for initiation of requirements in the biographic, industrial and graphics fields have not been assigned and neither OCD nor ORE is sure of its responsibility to initiate or to coordinate these requirements.

(2) No policy has been established as to the need for or desirability of ORE-OSI reviewing the requirements of non-production offices of the Agency, i.e., OO, OSO, and OPC.

2. A discussion of Information Requirements requires clarification of the term "information requirement". In its broadest sense an information requirement could be any request for intelligence information, such as:

1/ Unauthorized deviations are discussed in paragraph 4.

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- a. Request for a book in the library
- b. Request for field collection of information not previously documented, or
- c. Request for a research study by IAC or through external research facilities.

Factors a and b above fell within the "requirements" concept which prevailed within CIA until the reorganization of OCD in June of 1948. At that time, it was decided to exclude requests for documents from the "requirements" process. The third factor listed above has always been handled as part of the "production" process.

At this point, general agreement prevails that the "requirements" activity is concerned with direction of field collection. However, within this definition, a wide difference of opinion is found as to "what" action constitutes direction to collection facilities. For purposes of this discussion, three types of directive action can be identified and discussed separately:

- (1) General reporting guides.
- (2) Directives to the collecting facility for procuring and reporting specific information within specific time limitations.
- (3) Guidance to the field on the scope and method of reporting desired for currently strategic situations.

3. General Reporting Guides - This type of requirement action is processed through the requirements organization outlined in the preceding paragraph. This requirement is designed to guide the collector as to topics of interest.

No Agency pattern has been established for the presentation or initiation of this type of requirement. ORE has probably achieved the greatest uniformity whereby comprehensive guides (up to 50 pages) have been drawn up for each country. The content is in outline format with categorical breakdowns. It may be compared to the "Essential Elements of Information" issuance of the Department of the Army. Some divisions of ORE have made the issuance more meaningful by indicating on the margin opposite each entry a code for priority of need and another code indicating quality of existing reporting on that topic. It should be noted that because this issuance is a topical outline, no relationships between topics, other than categorical arrangement can be shown.

OSI is far behind ORE in issuance of meaningful collection guides. No attempt has been made to coordinate the ORE and OSI activity in this area. No action has been taken by either ORE or OSI to coordinate these guides with the IAC.

OCD has issued one such document on transportation requirements. The propriety of OCD action re this requirement was questioned by the Management Staff.

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4. Directives for Specific Information - This type of request is considered to be the most important and the bulk of requirements processed fall within this category. Like the reporting guides, these requirements must be processed through the requirements organization outlined in paragraph 1 above.

Surveys of OSI and ORE reveal that the ORE and OSI analysts are not initiating many of these requirements which are necessary to objective intelligence estimating. For example:

25X1 [redacted] Within the past six months, one requirement was initiated in October, one in November and a third in February. Discussion with analysts concerned indicated considerable need for further information.

b. Within calendar year 1949, OSI initiated only 34 requirements of this type, even though OSI recognizes that the need for scientific information is critical.

Immediately, the question of why these requirements are not being initiated arises. Several answers to this question were supplied:

a. The processing machinery is too slow. When questions arise, answers must be promptly obtained to be of value. An ORE study revealed that in many cases sixty days elapsed from the initiation of the requirement until the request was dispatched to the field. It should be noted that in addition to the sixty days mentioned above, an additional fifteen to thirty days must be added for collection and transmission of the reply. (Of course, many collection actions under study require months to complete.)

b. Controls and reviews inherent in the present processing machinery are unduly time-consuming to the analyst - The analyst is greatly limited by strict interpretation of the criteria set forth in paragraph 1b above at all control points. He must be prepared to justify his requirement in fullest detail showing that the request meets each qualification. In practically each instance the request is rewritten at one of the control points and the analyst must either compromise on amount or kind of information requested or be prepared to spend many hours explaining the intelligence situation which has prompted the request. Examples of actions resulting from this strict control follow:

(1) After three months of waiting, an analyst in ORE was advised that the report which prompted his inquiry for further information satisfied his requirement.

(2) A bibliography of reference materials compiled by the CIA Library from Library of Congress catalogs was presented to an OSI analyst as satisfying his request for field collection.

c. The communication necessary to developing mutual understanding by analyst and collector of analyst's need is denied by interjection of control points. In many instances a rather full discussion of the intelligence situation is required to place the questions at issue in proper perspective. This is particularly true when an analyst wants a newly-developing trend kept under close observation by the field collectors. Such explanations are too lengthy for inclusion in requirements as presently constituted and are not considered to be sufficiently definitive. Also, the analyst may be told that this situation is covered by outstanding reporting guides and will be reported spontaneously by the field.

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e. Faulty Direction of Collection Action - Collection action is largely directed in accordance with sources suggested by the ORE/OSI analyst. The only marked deviation is in the attempts made to utilize OCD library and register facilities in lieu of field action. In those instances the analyst may be given materials he already has rather than the additional information he desires. Those responsible for assigning collection action do not have adequate knowledge of collection capabilities of the suppliers. For example:

(1) Certain directories requested by OSI were directed to State for Embassy action. Six months time elapsed in satisfaction of the requirement. In the meantime, OSI informally located and borrowed the desired volumes in the Department of the Army.

(2) ORE requested the reaction of industry in a European nation toward legislation changing labor practices. ORE indicated State to be used as the source. Subsequently collection action was assigned to State with no consideration being given to utilization of OO/C facilities.



The situations described above have prompted considerable informal collection action within ORE and OSI, which action has not been handled through the established requirements process. These informal collection actions include:

- a. Initiation of action through IAC or SO counterpart.
- b. Utilization of personal relationships to obtain answers through non-established collection sources.
- c. Inclusion of requirements in evaluations and in production papers. (This action will be more fully discussed in the succeeding paragraph.)

5. Continuing collection guidance - This type of collection direction has taken place apart from the requirements process and in some instances is not recognized as collection guidance. It has developed from recognition of an existing need for communicating with the collector about developing situations. In this type of action, the production analyst discusses current situations with the collector and indicates trends which appear to be developing and why he thinks such is the case. In return, he hopes that the collector will watch the situation and send him information which will confirm or deny his hypothesis. This type of guidance has been incorporated into two kinds of papers:

a. Evaluations - Here the analyst discusses the contents of a report, tells the collector if the information is useful and what further information he would like on the subject in question. This vehicle is used principally in communication with OSO and OO/C, since each of their reports are evaluated. The information resulting from this type of communication with the collector has been of great value to the ORE analysts. However, one ORE division has recently been enjoined from including requirements in evaluations. Unless this procedure is recognized and legalized for its requirements aspects, this requirements channel may be cut off completely to the possible detriment of both the production analyst and the collector.

b. Production papers - This vehicle was particularly used by OSI. However, some ORE division working papers do set forth both trends that need watching and information gaps. Since requirements become most apparent at time of production, it is very easy for the analyst to include them at time of production. While there is no assurance that collection action will result, there is always the chance that the collecting agencies will be influenced to the extent that they will initiate collection action to cover these information gaps.



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a. Determination of what type of collection guidance should be handled within a requirements organization and clarification of responsibilities for requirement action.

b. Development of a requirements organization and procedures which will permit:

(1) Easy initiation of requirements.

(2) Speedy action on dispatch of requests to the field.

(3) Adequate guidance from producers of national intelligence to field activities.

(4) Effective coordination of requirements from both collection and production viewpoints, both within CIA and possibly by joint CIA-IAC type action. (such as joint committees.)

c. Improvement of service to CIA from collection facilities.

7. The following suggestions have been made by ORE-OSI analysts for improvement of both requirement and collection activities:

a. Coordination of all requirements and assignment of collection action by originating production division.

b. Assignment of requirement activity to a member of the production division who will be empowered to deal directly with all collectors' agents.

c. Establishment of operational liaison between regional desks of ORE-OSI and OO/C and OSO whereby requirement action will be handled directly between CIA producers and collectors. (In process of implementation.)

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f. Expansion of ORE-OSI requirements staffs to permit assignment of a staff member to each ORE regional division and OSI functional division for complete handling of requirement from time of its inception to action by collector, thereby eliminating OCD from the requirement process.

g. Participation by ORE and OSI in the operational planning of all collection facilities, but in particular of those in CIA.

h. NSC direction to IAC collectors to give priority to all CIA requests.

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j. Recognition of the "evaluation" as a requirement vehicle, without subjecting it to requirement controls.

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TAB D

3 July, 1950

Acting Executive

Management Officer

Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions

1. There is attached hereto a draft of a proposed plan for the realignment of certain Agency functions based on studies made by this office and comments received from various operating officials. Briefly the plan proposes the following changes:

a. Redesignate Office of Collection and Dissemination as Office of Reference and Dissemination.

b. Transfer function of coordination of requirements and assignment of collection action from OCD to joint control of ORE and OSI.

c. Transfer function of collection of material from other government agencies from OCD to OO.

d. Transfer ORE presentation function to OO.

e. Transfer function of governmental liaison control and records from OCD to I&SS.

f. Redesignate Office of Operations as Office of Overt Collection.

g. Transfer function of administrative machine records support from OCD to SSS.

2. It is our belief that the proposal submitted has been soundly conceived and that if adopted will result in more efficient and effective Agency operations.

3. Request authority to coordinate the proposed plan with all interested components of the Agency.

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Encl: Proposed Plan

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP57-00042A000100150001-2

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TAB D

10 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination  
Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates  
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence  
Assistant Director for Operations  
Assistant Director for Special Operations  
Assistant Director for Policy Coordination  
Chief, Inspection and Security Staff  
Chief, Special Support Staff  
Chief, Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Realignment of Certain Agency Functions.

1. There is attached hereto a copy of a proposed plan recently submitted to the Acting Executive concerning realignment of certain Agency functions. The Acting Executive has approved our request for coordination of the plan.

2. It is requested that you review the plan and submit your comments or concurrence to this office by 28 July 1950.

/s/

Management Officer

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Attachment: Plan re Realignment of Certain Agency Functions.

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP57-00042A000100150001-2

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TAB D

DRAFT 3 July 1950

PROPOSED PLAN FOR REALIGNMENT OF CERTAIN AGENCY FUNCTIONS

1. A series of Management Staff studies of CIA operations undertaken within the past year disclose that serious deterrents to operating efficiency could be removed by realignment of Agency functions. Therefore, it is recommended that the Office of Collection and Dissemination be redesignated the Office of Reference and Dissemination and that the major functions listed below be transferred as indicated.

2. Coordination of information requirements and assignment of collection action from OCD, Liaison Division, to joint control of the requirements Staffs of the Assistant Directors of ORE and OSI.

Discussion: The functions of coordinating requirements and assigning collection action are so closely integrated that they can properly be considered as a single function. Experience has shown that requirements have been most easily satisfied when informal liaison with the collecting agency is possible in the initial stages of requirements formulation. The timing of requirements, as well as the information to be collected, must be evaluated for collectability by the collector. In many cases, the collector is the dominating factor as to whether certain information can be obtained and should be formalized as a requirement. Full coordination of requirements in the production offices will, as a matter of course, provide for the participation of OO and SO in the requirements activity. Also, it is anticipated that the requirements coordination activity will encompass, in varying degrees, participation of both intelligence contributors and information collectors of all the agencies represented on the IAC. Thus, collection action will be effected on an agree-

ment basis as well as on an assignment basis. As a joint responsibility of ORE and OSI, each requirement will be processed by the Agency component who is most interested in obtaining the necessary information for the proper evaluation of intelligence, with such requesting component being empowered to negotiate directly with the collecting facilities at an early stage of requirement formulation.

Further, there will be one less echelon in the requirements process. Experience has indicated that for every additional echelon between the formulation of a request and the completion of the action, the basic information desired is adulterated and possibly weakened. Also, the time taken to effect completed action on a requirement is lengthened by the additional processing required.

Under normal circumstances, the Management Staff would rarely recommend that a major function be placed under joint control of two Assistant Directors. In this case, however, it appears workable because scientific requirements are primarily generated in the scientific Intelligence Committee. Thus, except in isolated instance, all requirements of OSO, OPC, OO, and other intelligence Agencies referred for coordination will fall within the jurisdiction of ORE and can be directly routed to this Office for action. Coordination of ORE and OSI requirement activity can be enhanced by installation of uniform procedures and by physically locating these two Staffs in adjoining space.

3. Collection of intelligence materials available in operating units of other government agencies from OCD, Liaison Division, and from ORE, Presentation Division, to Office of Operations.

Discussion: The overt collection function of this Agency has been divided between several collection activities located in different Offices. It is envisaged that ultimately all overt collection will be located in one Office. The transfers proposed in this paragraph for immediate action would bring together all overt collection

25X1X4 activity  It is possible that this OSI activity could also be transferred to OO in the near future. Then, the Office of Operations could be renamed the Office of Overt Collection.

There is a very important further point to be considered in conjunction with assignment of the overt collection function. It is one thing to collect material, record it, index it, and place it on shelves for future reference. It is a quite different proposition to collect intelligence materials analyze, select, and edit the information and prepare information reports from these materials in satisfaction of information requirements of the production analysts. Also, OO, who is now CIA's primary overt collection facility, has the experience, resources, and capabilities to effect a better collection action than OCD, ORE, or OSI for whom overt collection is a secondary responsibility.

4. Governmental Liaison controls and records from the Liaison Division, OCD, to Inspection and Security Staff.

Discussion: Primary Agency control of official liaison of CIA employees with employees of other government agencies is vested in I&SS, who in the final instance determines from a security standpoint whether liaison contact may be established and continued. Therefore,

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it would appear logical that I&SS should approve or disapprove original contacts, should supervise liaison established on a continuing basis, and should maintain the control registers. Through functional realignments suggested above, which group like functions under one office, the instance of duplication of contacts between Offices would be negligible. The Assistant Directors, as part of their administrative duties, are presently controlling duplication of contacts between divisions of their Offices and other agencies of the Government.

5. Machine records support for administrative operations from Machine Methods Division, OCD, to the Special Support Staff.

Discussion: It is a known fact that economy and efficiency can be obtained from centralization of like machine records activities. It is wholly reasonable that the Offices in L and K Buildings do not wish another office to handle their very sensitive T/Os, rosters, etc. Conversely, the other parts of the Agency could have no objection to having their administrative activities handled by a more sensitive operation in CIA. Thus, it is proposed that all the machine records support relating to administrative matters be located in L Building and handled by employees whose security clearance are acceptable to OPC, OSO and the Advisory Council. All substantive support will be retained by OCD.

6. The mission of the Office of Reference and Dissemination would enforce the two functions implied in the new name. It would be wholly responsible for the maintenance of library and reference materials such as those now held in the Library, the Biographic Division, the Industrial Division, and the Graphics Division. As part of this reference function



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it would perform certain collection activities. However, it would be a clear-out document type collection activity based on the fact that the materials being collected are reference materials and not a directed collection activity in the sense that OO and OSO conduct collection. Also, it would maintain the Agency archives, the records management program, courier and messenger service, the clipping service and all such common-type services as it is now rendering. Likewise, centralized machine records support to the substantive intelligence operations of the Agency would remain the responsibility of ORD. Exclusive responsibility for the dissemination function in the Agency would constitute the second major phase of the ORD mission. It is anticipated that this function can be further centralized and become of greater service to the Agency by elimination of duplicate dissemination activities in other CIA Offices and by placing greater responsibility with disseminators for the selection of intelligence materials to be routed to CIA components. (Now in process)

7. It is felt that while some of these activities are affected by the pending decision on NSC 50, most of these suggested changes can be effected without reference to NSC 50. However, I should like to make it a matter of record at this time that should this proposal be implemented and subsequently NSC 50 should be returned to CIA directing consolidation of SO, OPC, and OO/C this Office would urge that OO/C not be incorporated into the L Building consolidation. An Office of Overt Collection, as described in this proposal, would be quite different from the activities of an Office of Covert Collection and Special Operations. It is believed that CIA could operate more effectively by maintaining an Office of Overt Collection.

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TAB E

14 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff  
Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination  
Assistant Director for Operations  
Assistant Director for Special Operations

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Improvement of Collection Facilities  
Resulting from Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI.

1. Below are summarized the suggestions presented to Management Staff Survey Teams by ORE and OSI analysts for general improvement of collection coverage and service on requests of the production analysts for collection of information. Those suggestions, which relate specifically to one of the collection or reference facilities within CIA, are presented separately in memoranda to appropriate Assistant Directors.

2. Sources Requiring More Intensive Exploitation

a. Overt facilities for obtaining published materials about the Soviet and the Satellites, which may be available on Western Europe newstands.

b. Friendly foreign governments for information on the Soviet.

c. Foreign offices of friendly nations in areas where U.S. has no representation.


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3. Subjects Requiring Fuller Coverage



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4. Presentation and Transmission of Information

a. Include more comment and interpretation of the collector in information reports. Fuller information about enclosures, such as authorship, circulation, reaction of recipients to the document, would be helpful. Also, it was suggested that at least the table of contents of foreign-language enclosures be translated, and, if possible, an English-language resume of the foreign-language enclosure be included.

b. Include more opinion of the sub-source on the significance of the information he is reporting.

c. Follow-through to conclusion in subsequent reports, situations reported as impending developments.

d. Mark open-literature enclosures, submitted with classified reports, "unclassified" to permit easier handling.

e. Develop and employ a standard reporting format to be used by all collectors of intelligence data.

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f. Provide more rapid service on [ ] summaries.

g. Report back to the requester on the status of a requirement when delays are experienced in the collection of the desired information.

5. Coordination and Administration of the Collection Effort

a. Provide some type of "watch" or "control" procedure to insure that all new categories of information reports are brought into CIA and are appropriately disseminated within CIA, so that all interested analysts are included in the dissemination, e.g., survey action disclosed that OSI team reports were not being disseminated to ORE analysts or to other interested intelligence agencies.

b. Provide for the referral, to selected regional officials, of U. S. policy papers, memoranda of conversation, and other informal memoranda from the field, such as memoranda of MDAP officials to the home office.

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[ ]  
d. Provide for the full exploitation of [ ] documents on the Soviet and Satellites, now held in U. S. government agencies.

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e. Suggest that State Department stagger changes of personnel in its foreign offices to provide for continuity of reporting.

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[ ]  
Management Officer

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cc: Acting Executive  
AD/ORE  
AD/OSI  
Budget Officer

Concurred in by  
AD/ORE 26 July 1950.

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TAB "F"

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Assistant Director for Operations

JUL 14 1950

Management Officer

Suggestions for Improvement of OO Service Resulting from Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI.

1. Discussions with production analysts of ORE and OSI during Management Staff studies resulted in comments and suggestions on collection and other support rendered by other intelligence components to the production analysts. The suggestions for improvement of general collection coverage and service are contained in a memorandum to COAPS, et. al., dated 14 July 1950. Comments directed specifically toward the OO services are set forth below.

2. Satisfaction with OO service to the production analysts closely paralleled the degree to which communication had been established between working-levels of OO divisions and the production offices. The best illustration offered was that of ORE's Latin America Division. The analysts of this Division emphatically stated that OO/C rendered by far the best services of all collection facilities. The detail of a field collection specialist to D/LA proved of unquestionable value to both D/LA and to OO/C.

3. Contact Division - Specific suggestions for the improvement of the OO/C service to ORE and to OSI follow:

a. Suggestions relating to content and coverage include:

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(2) With establishment of working-level liaison between ORE-OSI analysts and OO/C area specialists, discontinue the "P and P" procedure for obtaining requirements for travellers. Instead, obtain requirements through informal working-level liaison.

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(4) Emphasize the collection of current information with decreased effort on collection of familiar and historical data.

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
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(4) Analysts in D/EE expressed a need for a bibliography, containing, if possible, a short resume of contents, of articles appearing in periodicals published outside the "Iron Curtain" countries, e.g., France, Italy, Scandinavia, which provide information on the Soviet and Satellite nations.

/s/



25X1A9A

cc: Acting Executive  
Chief, COAPS  
AD/ORE  
AD/OSI  
Budget Officer

Concurred in by  
AD/ORE - 26 July 1950.

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TAB "G"

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Assistant Director for Special Operations

14 July 1950

Management Officer

Suggestions for Improvement of OSO Collection Service Resulting  
from Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI

1. Discussions with production analysts of ORE and OSI during Management Staff studies resulted in comments and suggestions on collection support rendered by other intelligence components to the production analysts. The suggestions for improvement of the general collection coverage and service are contained in memorandum to COAPS, et. al., dated 14 July 1950. Comments directed specifically toward the OSO service are set forth below.

2. Satisfaction with OSO service to the production analysts closely paralleled the degree to which communication had been established between working levels of OSO and the production office. Where such communication had been established, more requirements for information were formulated and satisfied. Conversely, where such communication was absent, production analysts withheld formulation of requirements because of their reluctance to assign to OSO perilous tasks and because the validity of requirements previously submitted for OSO action were challenged by OSO. Benefits accruing to OSO from working-level liaison with the production offices are formulation of more realistic requirements for OSO collection action and the availability of ORE expert assistance in evaluating the intelligence worth of and desirability of disseminating questionable information received from the field. Thus, it appears that both the ORE-OSI production and the OSO collection operations would be enhanced by extension of informal desk-to-desk liaison between these offices to all regional and functional areas covered by ORE and OSI.

3. Specific suggestions of ORE-OSI analysts relating to the content and coverage of OSO reporting follow:

a. Expand coverage of information about the Satellite countries and China.

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d. Supplement reports with observations on standards of living and the situation in general for critical areas behind the "Iron Curtain".



e. Provide covert collection for overt information, not otherwise obtainable from the "Iron Curtain" countries.

f. Provide fuller reporting on situations and trends. The general comment was that OSO reporting on individuals was excellent, but that the preoccupation with the individual often detracted from the reporting desired on situations, movements, etc.

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4. Specific suggestions of ORE-OSI analysts relating to presentation and transmission of OSO information follow:

a. By code or some similar device, indicate those reports which emanate from the same source.

b. Lessen the time lag between collection of the information and its receipt by interested analysts.

c. Refer all enclosures received to the interested CIA analysts prior to referral to analysts of other intelligence agencies.

d. Refer all intelligence data collected to the appropriate ORE or OSI analyst, utilizing the knowledge of the production analyst to determine if the information is of sufficient interest to warrant broader dissemination.

5. The possibility of coordinating the OSO training program with basic research requirements of ORE was suggested during the survey. It would appear that this suggestion should be explored for advantages which might accrue to both ORE and to OSO.

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cc: Acting Executive  
Chief, COAPS  
AD/ORE  
AD/OSI  
Budget Officer

Concurred in by  
AD/ORE - 26 July 1950.

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TAB "H"

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JUL 14 1950

Assistant Director for Collection and  
Dissemination  
Management Officer

Suggestions for Improvement of OCD Service Resulting from Management  
Staff Studies of ORE and OSI.

1. Discussions with production analysts of ORE and OSI during Management Staff studies resulted in comments and suggestions for improvement of the support activities of the Agency and of other intelligence agencies. Suggestions for improvement of the general collection coverage and service are contained in a memorandum to Chief, COAPS, et. al., dated 14 July 1950. Survey findings relating to requirements are set forth in a memorandum to COAPS dated 25 May 1950. Management Staff recommendations are presented in a memorandum to the Executive, dated 2 July 1950, titled, "Realignment of Certain Agency Functions". Comments directed specifically toward the OCD service are set forth below.

2. The majority of analysts expressed growing confidence in the ability of OCD reference facilities to serve them satisfactorily. They specifically indicated that OCD service had improved immeasurably within the last year. However, they still expressed a reluctance to depend exclusively on OCD for service on materials held by OCD for reference purposes. Instead, practically all continued to maintain files of reference material known to be available in OCD. However, a trend toward discontinuance of individual holdings as confidence in OCD increased was discerned. Throughout the survey, Management Staff members encouraged the production analysts to utilize and to rely on OCD service to the utmost. Three criticisms levelled at all of the OCD Divisions were:

a. Failure to advise requester on status of his request when immediate satisfaction was not possible.

b. Tendency to supply considerable data which was not pertinent to the request.

c. Absence of a central request-receiving point for obtaining information from one or more OCD Divisions.

3. Suggestions of ORE-OSI analysts relating to the Liaison Division follow:

a. Provide more intensive exploitation of the holdings of materials of intelligence interest in the Federal Government, particularly the agencies not represented on the IAC.

b. Administer operational liaison controls in such a manner as to permit continuing operational liaison between ORE-OSI analysts and counterparts in other agencies, without referral to Liaison Division prior to each visit. Agency policy set forth in Administrative Instruction No.   condones this type of control.

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c. Identify, arrange for security clearance, and establish contacts for ORE and OSI analysts with technicians in non-IAC agencies, such as the Federal Power Commission, to permit utilization of such technicians for consulting purposes.

d. Procure reference data on the organization, functions, and staffing of other intelligence agencies.

e. Arrange for the reproduction of meaningful single-copy enclosures whenever dissemination indicates referral to several recipients.

4. Suggestions of ORE-OSI analysts relating to the services of the Registers follow:

a. Cross-reference the holdings of Graphics Register, Industrial Register, and Biographic Register so that a request to one of these Registers will indicate the existence of further information in another Register.

b. As requested, route new acquisitions of the Graphics Register to regional divisions of ORE for the information of interested analysts and to stimulate ORE interest in the services offered by the Graphics Register.

c. Explore the possibility of D/EE, Economic Branch, indicating materials to be maintained in the Industrial Register. Need exists for developing some means for reorganizing the Industrial Register holdings and keeping such holdings current so they can be used by D/EE, Economic Branch, thus eliminating duplication of plant files in D/EE.

d. Discontinue preparation and issuance of Industrial Information Reports now being prepared in the Industrial Register. Instead, devote working facilities of the Division to bringing files up-to-date.

e. Supply ORE analysts with dossiers, when such are available in Biographic Register, rather than preparing biographic reports.

5. Suggestions of ORE-OSI analysts relating to the Library follow:

a. Acquire and maintain in the Library for reference use:

(1) Current organization, staffing, and functions charts of the agencies represented on the IAC.


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- (2) Yearbooks, almanacs, etc., of the Satellite countries.
  - (3) The United States Treaty Series.
  - (4) The United States Trade Agreements.
  - (5) Information about and organization charts of the International Organizations.
- b. Provide better and faster service on inter-Library loan.
- c. Forward meaningful single-copy enclosures to interested ORE-OSI Divisions upon receipt, rather than waiting for the division to request such enclosures.
- d. List privately-owned reference books brought into the Agency by CIA and make such listing available to interested analysts.
- e. Provide a bibliography containing, if possible, a short resume of contents, of articles appearing in English-language periodicals, which provide information on the Soviet and Satellites.
- f. Continue present efforts to fit the Agency classification system to analyst needs.
- g. Emphasize "service" attitude for all employees. Instances of reluctance of Library employees to serve were reported by various production analysts.
- h. Increase efforts to orient all employees fully in Library holdings and procedures. Many instances of failure to give service were attributed to unfamiliarity of Library personnel with content and location of Library holdings.

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cc: Acting Executive  
Chief, COAPS  
AD/ORE  
AD/OSI  
Budget Officer

Concurred in by  
AD/ORE - 26 July 1950.

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Exempt from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
1-2286*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Management Officer

FROM : Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

SUBJECT: Comments on Management Staff Study of Regional Divisions of the Office of Reports and Estimates

DATE:

1. The Management Staff Study containing the findings of a survey of the ORE regional divisions, is an extremely useful document, identifying major problems and presenting an excellent summary of problems that require a coordinated effort by all components of CIA to resolve them. The Management Staff has done an outstanding job in its survey, particularly in view of the size and complexity of the problems involved. ORE views concerning the reasons for some of the more important problems and steps that have been taken to resolve some of them are set forth below.

2. ORE comments on the individual headings of the Staff Study follow:

a. Production

ORE believes that the various problems connected with the production of intelligence stem from the following factors:

(1) Inadequacies in the basic directives, particularly the NSCID's and the approved Statements of Functions of the various CIA components.

(2) Lack of cooperation on the part of the IAC agencies.

(3) Non-existence of a generally accepted body of doctrine covering:

(a) The role of intelligence in the formulation of Foreign Policy.

(b) The logical consequences of this role in the organization and functions of an intelligence organization.

(4) Past failure of responsible echelons in CIA to acquaint themselves with production problems and take aggressive action to resolve them.

(5) Inadequate liaison with key policy-making and intelligence officials.

With regard to the basic directive, it is believed that the recently approved Statement of Functions for ORE will be of material assistance in directing the production effort. In December 1949, ORE

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collaborated with the Legal Staff which submitted to COAPS a draft NSCID designed to remedy other deficiencies in the basic directives. This directive, in amended form, was approved by the DCI on 25 July 1950 and has yet to be submitted through channels for approval by the National Security Council.

Lack of IAC cooperation was reported to the DCI on 30 September 1949 with supporting examples.

The ORE Plans and Policy Staff and various ad hoc committees have addressed themselves to the problem of developing an adequate intelligence doctrine. It is believed that ORE thought on this subject is relatively mature and ORE action and recommendations are based wherever possible on conclusions derived from this study. The problem of disseminating this doctrine within ORE, however, has not yet been resolved.

A program for the training and orientation of ORE analysts has been under study for some time. Such a program would be of material benefit in communicating developed doctrine to the analysts but the staffing of such a training program and the inroads that the program would make into the current production effort are difficulties that must be overcome.

While ORE is able to identify the key policy making and intelligence officials with whom it should be in constant contact, it has been unable to establish such contacts because of an inadequate staff and the fact that agency contact with many of these officials is reserved to non-substantive components of the agency. ORE is particularly desirous of establishing close liaison with the Executive Office of the President, the National Security Council, the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Resources Board. While there is some contact with the National Security Council staff, other contacts are in practice non-existent. ORE's production planning activities have been drastically impaired by this situation.

The complexity of the world situation requires considerable intra-ORE coordination of papers. The newly organized Special Staff, however, is proving to be a valuable device for achieving this coordination informally and rapidly. The main asset of such a staff, however, is its ability to produce high quality estimates in greater volume than was previously possible on a decentralized basis and with a more coordinated coverage of the total world situation.

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b. Basic Research

Basic research in the intelligence community is required to serve four general intelligence needs:

- (1) To support the production of National Intelligence.
- (2) To support strategic and tactical plans and operations.
- (3) To provide information for specialized operations (e.g., psychological warfare, covert operations, etc.)
- (4) To permit effective implementation of operational programs (e.g., export control, stockpiling of strategic materials, etc.)

The NIS program is devoted almost entirely to the basic research needed in (2) above. Aside from the study of basic economic intelligence on the Soviet orbit and map and geographic intelligence, there has been no adequate, clear-cut provision for the production of basic intelligence in fulfillment of the needs stated in (1), (3), and (4). ORE has had to engage in some basic research on an ad hoc basis in order to meet its own needs in these categories. In some cases it has had assistance from the IAC agencies and from external sources. None of the sources have proved adequate, however, and a grave problem remains, which requires a fundamental solution including a re-examination of the NIS program and its relative priority as compared with the other categories of basic intelligence.

c. Requirements

ORE has always emphasized that the role of its Requirements Staff should be that of expeditor and trouble-shooter, not a restrictive channel. The Staff is required, however, to see that ORE requirements are in collectible form. The AD/ORE receives a monthly report from all ORE components on the usefulness of the Requirements Staff and few complaints, such as indicated in the survey, have been received. It is believed that such complaints probably stem from personalities or analyst reaction to a situation concerning which they were not fully informed. The "Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions", if implemented, should permit a more effective development of the requirements function.

d. Collection

ORE has always taken the position that collection should be directly responsive to the needs of the production components. Direct contact between analysts and collectors is highly desirable, but the complexity of the collection apparatus and the lack of clearly established responsibilities vis-a-vis ORE on the part of the various collectors

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creates the need for some sort of central coordinating group such as the ORE Requirements Staff. Inadequacies in the collection apparatus have also created a back-log of frustration in the individual analyst that makes him reluctant to devote what has seemed unproductive effort to the formulation of requirements. The Requirements Staff has also, therefore, had to encourage and stimulate the formulation of requirements.

e. Information Control

Some time ago ORE agreed to a 90-day trial of centralized routing of incoming documents. This trial was delayed when OSI questioned the efficiency of such a system which they were currently using. It is suggested that if the OSI objections have now been satisfactorily answered, the ORE trial period originally contemplated should be undertaken.

f. Administrative considerations

ORE consistently attempts to take action in the light of an intimate knowledge of the problems involved in the production of intelligence. ORE shares the analysts' views that these problems are not adequately recognized in some parts of the agency. Obviously it is impossible to consult all interested analysts when administrative matters affecting them are under consideration, but this problem is overcome in part by the selection of key officials with adequate substantive competence and experience in intelligence production and by frequent consultation with representative analysts in various components of the Office.

3. In order to take effective action to resolve the problems cited in the Management Staff Survey, it is important that the action be carefully considered in the light of over-all agency problems. It is therefore recommended that the Management Staff detail an analyst to ORE for a period of ninety days to assist in a task force devoted specifically to the cited ORE problems. Many of the problems will require long-range effort to resolve and others will require action in other parts of CIA.

[Redacted Signature]

THEODORE RABBITT

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP57-00042A000100150001-2

ref ER 1 - 2254

13 September 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive

SUBJECT: Management Study of Regional Divisions of ORE -  
Comment on

REFERENCE: (a) Management Memorandum to AD/ORE, dated  
14 July 1950  
(b) COAPS Memorandum to Management, dated  
7 July 1950  
(c) COAPS Memorandum to Management, dated  
19 July 1950  
(d) Management Memorandum to COAPS, dated  
28 August 1950

1. In the submission of this comment upon Management's report of a Survey of ORE regional divisions, the outline defined by the major paragraph headings of reference (a), has been followed. In instances where COAPS has already formally commented upon certain sections of the combined report, which were promulgated by Management individually in advance of completion of the Survey as a whole, such replies have been incorporated herein, by reference only.

2. Production

(a) In general, COAPS concurs in Management's recommendations on Production. The opinions, queries and contentions of ORE personnel who were interviewed in connection with this Survey, relate almost exclusively to ORE internal administration, and accordingly were referred to the AD/ORE for his consideration, and for such action as he might deem appropriate.

This report should be of considerable value to the AD/ORE as a basis for ascertaining the desirability of adjustment of organization and procedures, in the interest of improvement of internal working relationships.

It is believed that many of the uncertainties, under which interviewed personnel were laboring, might have been relieved, had they been referred upward to the appropriate level in ORE. This belief, therefore, suggests the desirability of close-coupling, by firm supervisory relationships, a large organization such as ORE, which may be inclined to sprawl and to become compartmentalized. In amelioration of this tendency, it is suggested that, in general, all effort expended should be responsive to directives generated

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in the office of the AD/ORE. The impression given, correct or incorrect, is to the effect that each Division is largely "on its own," and consequently each must determine independently, in what manner its time and efforts shall be spent. Also, effective as a unifying medium, is the establishment of a body of ORE doctrine - (what to do; when to do it; and how to do it as the AD/ORE wants it) - in order that an 'output' which has been subjected to uniform manner of treatment, evolves from each of the several offices of original effort and thereupon undergoes uniform processing. And lastly, a program of training should be instituted in order that there may be a common understanding of instructions and doctrine enunciated by the AD/ORE, and also to bridge the several independent Divisions and to bridge the echelons of review and correlation, in order to effect the best possible co-operative effort. This training program should provide for personal contact among members of the normal administrative organization, and should not involve the introduction of full-time employees as "instructors."

(b) The establishment and maintenance of good inter-office relations at the working level is encouraged in the interest of an 'over-all' saving in time, and also an individual saving in time of intermediaries not essential to the transaction. Such a relationship must necessarily be controlled, however, in order to provide for proper record-keeping and to ensure that responsible officials are not by-passed in matters concerning which they have *interest* *Let* enunciated no controlling policy. In the case of inter-office disagreements, the Agency Organization adequately provides for arbitration at the AD level. If unsuccessful, the subject matter of the disagreement should be reduced to writing by each proponent, and forwarded to the Executive via COAPS.

(c) The establishment and maintenance of informal inter-agency liaison on a Desk-to-Desk - (Division Chief level) - basis is approved, provided that such liaison arrangements are established by or with the approval of the AD/OCD. Official inter-agency relations, however, are governed by inter-agency agreements. In the absence of a governing agreement, satisfaction of CIA requests, if realized, proceeds from a willing and cooperative spirit, only. The failure of an outside agency to perform under an existing agreement, however, should be reduced to writing and forwarded to the Director via COAPS.

(d) The decision as to whether ORE Divisions do or do not produce "Working Papers" should be left to the AD/ORE. However, this determination should be based exclusively upon the ORE need for this type of publication, and in no case should distribution outside of CIA be made.

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### 3. Basic Research

So long as CIA labors under NSCIDs which vest no power to direct the IAC agencies to accept projects and to establish priority of accomplishment, ORE cannot avoid the prosecution of basic research required to support the production of National Intelligence, and to support Special Operations in which CIA engages. The effort spent on basic research will not be uniform among the several Divisions, but will vary according to gaps created by the unavailability of timely information. For example, it appears that D/EE is wholly justified in engaging in full-scale basic research, with the requirement, however, that D/EE, Economics and Transportation, do not duplicate the effort of one another.

Admittedly, the NIS volumes when complete, will not obviate the necessity for continued basic research by the Area Desks, since they are specifically designed for use by the strategic and tactical military planners, and not for the intelligence analyst. But, while the NIS compendium of basic information may not fulfill the needs of the analyst by reason of its length, breadth and degree of detail, it is anomalous to contend that basic facts recorded by the NIS group should differ from basic facts gathered by ORE analysts. The issue then becomes one to ascertain which reporter has correctly stated the facts, if there has been a disagreement. But if the development of the NIS work is to become embroiled in extended inquiry, the job will never be done. The only practicable working procedure must provide for the resolution of all disagreements by the NIS Coordinator, irrespective of whether or not the ORE analyst prevails. This procedure should not, however, operate to ignore the Area Analysts entirely; as NIS manuscript is prepared it should, without exception, be referred to them according as their respective interests appear.

### 4. Requirements

Tab (C) to reference (a), on "Information Requirements" which was addressed to COAPS under date of 25 May 1950, was answered in detail by COAPS memorandum to Management, dated 7 July 1950.

Tab (D) to reference (a) "Proposed Plan for Realignment of Certain Agency Functions" dated 10 July 1950, which was forwarded to the several ADs and Staff Chiefs, was answered by COAPS memorandum to Management under date of 19 July 1950. In this latter memorandum, COAPS agreed to the proposed realignment of Agency Functions with certain reservations.

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### 5. Collection

While COAPS concurs in Management's recommendations on Collection, it is suggested that the items listed in Tab (E) be held in contemplation in the course of the preparation of general collection guides. But we may just as well be realistic in our normal desire for bigger and better collection effort clear across the board, and recognize that under the existing directives (actually agreements) which control inter-agency relationships, we are almost wholly dependent upon the other agencies for overt collection abroad, and moreover, each in truth assigns priorities governing the activities of its own field organization.

Unless and until the existing basic directives are so modified as to vest in the DCI, power to direct, there is ample justification for the establishment of an overt field reporting service in foreign areas. However, coordination of the existing "collectors" is preferable to adding another collector in the field.

Referring to Tab (F), COAPS persists in an attitude which encourages informal inter-office liaison at the working level, as not only desirable, but as essential to the functioning of CIA as an entity, instead of as a sporadic array of exclusive interests. Such liaison should be exercised within the knowledge and concurrence of the ADs concerned, however.

The suggestion that FDD translators be assigned to ORE and OSI to serve as scanners for analysts who lack the language skills, has considerable merit. However, FDD has been endeavoring to augment its staff over the period of the past two years, but acquisitions have been painfully slow, due principally to the stringent security clearance process which presently enables acceptance of only 10% of the total applications. Accordingly, FDD is in a poor position to dissipate its limited translation pool by remote assignment. It is suggested that ORE on its own initiative might propose an increase in T/O to provide for the employment of a small number of linguists possessing the desired specialized qualifications.

Referring to Tab (G), again inter-office liaison, at the working level in order to foster better understanding between analyst and collector, is to be encouraged, as stated above. The actual formulation and processing of a requirement which requires field collection, however, must conform to approved procedure, and be handled through OCD.

It is gratifying to note in Tab (H), the expression of growing confidence in the ability of OCD to provide satisfactory service to the ORE and OSI analysts. The more fully OCD enjoys the cooperation of the information users in the production organization, the better will OCD be able to satisfy the needs of the latter. The retention of reference files by analysts is not objectionable, provided they remain small and

are limited to reference material of current interest.

The suggestions proffered by the analysts for improvement of the service rendered by OCD, if followed through, should redound to the distinct advantage of the former. The virtue of this type of Survey lies in providing opportunity for a correlative airing of views. Largely, the recorded suggestions are desirable; some are not attainable failing a prohibitive increase in force, still others will undergo gradual improvement over a considerable period of time. But the maximum in benefit is derived from bringing the problems and gripes out into the open, where all can gain an objective view of them.

6. Information Control and Reference Activity

It is agreed that the Information Control activity of ORE is excessively heavy, and involves an unwarranted expenditure of time and manpower in relation to the total ORE effort. COAPS accordingly concurs in the recommendation that the plan presented in Management Memorandum to AD/ORE, dated 29 November 1949, be implemented at this time.

7. Administrative Considerations

The most significant recommendation submitted by Management under this heading is that for satisfactory working space for those employees whose regular job assignment requires that they engage in analytical and creative thinking. The existing situation which finds analysts grouped together in spaces which admit of no degree of individual privacy for thought or for purpose of consultation, is wasteful to the point of becoming intolerable. Two persons engaged in such mental effort, can occupy the same partitioned space reasonably, but additions to this number only results in a rapid decline in satisfactory output.

8. Review of this combined Management Survey Report has been unduly time consuming, due to the piecemeal issuance and organization of the report material. Had the report been a single manuscript instead of a collection of several elements, initially issued separately, it could have been digested more expeditiously and with greater facility.

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PRESCOTT CHILDS, Chief  
Coordination, Operations  
and Policy Staff

cc: Management Officer  
AD/ORE

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Management Officer  
Acting  
FROM : Assistant Director for Operations

DATE: 11 August 1950

SUBJECT: Suggestions resulting from Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI

- Reference: a. Your memorandum to OO "Suggestions for Improvement of OO Service resulting from Management Studies of ORE and OSI" dated 14 July 50
- b. Your memorandum to COAPS et.al. "Suggestions for Improvement of Collection Facilities (etc.)" dated 14 July 50

1. The constructive suggestions of your staff as transmitted by reference memoranda have been studied by this office and will be helpful in planning our operations. Although many of the points raised are scarcely new, such as the provision of more adequate translation service, or expansion of the program for the exploitation of aliens, we appreciate the objectivity of your comments, and believe that some of the problems may be solved by a joint approach and by implementation of some of your suggestions by our respective staffs.

25X1A7B 2. Detailed discussion of each of your suggestions is contained, insofar as each division is concerned, in one of the attached memoranda from the Chiefs Contact Division, [redacted] and Foreign Documents Division. I concur with the remarks of the division chiefs, and believe that each point has been satisfactorily covered. Action will be taken as indicated in the divisional memoranda. Two points were, however, inadvertently omitted in the attached discussions:

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3. With regard to your suggestion on the use of private translating services to supplement the translation facilities of FDD (reference a Para 5b (1) ), it is believed that the current tentative plan to establish an auxiliary pool of uncleared personnel to translate unclassified material under the direct supervision of FDD would be more efficient and less expensive than contractual arrangements with a commercial service. Cost data supporting this opinion are included in the FDD attachment. It is requested that further plans for such a separate "translation service" be developed jointly by your staff and representatives of this office.

[Redacted Signature Box]

FOIAB3B

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK

Attachments (3)

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director for Operations

DATE: 7 August 1950

FROM : Chief, Contact Division

SUBJECT: Management Officer's Suggestions for Improvement  
of OO/C ServiceREFERENCE: Memorandum from Management Officer to AD/OO, dated 14 July 1950,  
Subject: Suggestions for Improvement of OO Service Resulting from  
Management Staff Studies of ORE and OSI.

In compliance with the instructions contained on your 28 July routing slip, Contact Division offers the following comments on applicable paragraphs of the reference memorandum. Paragraph numbering corresponds to that of the reference.

"2. Satisfaction with OO service to the production analysts closely paralleled the degree to which communication had been established between working-levels of OO divisions and the production offices. The best illustration offered was that of ORE's Latin America Division. The analysts of this Division emphatically stated that OO/C rendered by far the best services of all collection facilities. The detail of a field collection specialist to D/LA proved of unquestionable value to both D/LA and to OO/C."

Comment: Contact Division agrees that satisfaction with OO service to the production analysts closely parallels the degree to which communication has been established by the working-levels, although this closeness of liaison is only one of several factors which make service satisfactory. All branches of the Division have been instructed to work closely with their opposite numbers in ORE and OSI. The major impediment to even closer liaison has been discussed frequently --as a personnel problem--with ORE. In fact we have told ORE that the most desirable procedure for handling requirements would be as outlined in ORE's own memorandum of 10 April 1950, addressed to the Executive, Management Officer, and the Chief, COAPS, subject: Requirements. Grateful for the compliment paid to our Latin American Branch by the Management Officer, we nevertheless believe that this branch's record on successful liaison is representative of rather than an exception to the record of all the branches.

"3. Contact Division - Specific suggestions for the improvement of the OO/C service to ORE and to OSI follow:

"a. Suggestions relating to content and coverage include:

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"4. Presentation and Transmission of Information

"a. Include more comment and interpretation of the collector in information reports. Fuller information about enclosures, such as authorship, circulation, reaction of recipients to the document, would be helpful. Also, it was suggested that at least the table of contents of foreign-language enclosures be translated, and, if possible, an English-language resume of the foreign-language enclosure be included."

Comment: Contact Division believes that it complies in most cases with the suggestions made in this subparagraph. However we will attempt to expand information about authorship, circulation, and reaction of recipients to the documents disseminated.

"b. Include more opinion of the sub-source on the significance of the information he is reporting."

Comment: Contact Division always has emphasized to its collectors the value of the opinion of the sub-source on the significance of the information. We will continue to emphasize this value, particularly when the information is technical in nature.

"c. Follow-through to conclusion in subsequent reports, situations reported as impending developments."

Comment: Agree.

"d. Mark open-literature enclosures, submitted with classified reports, 'unclassified' to permit easier handling."

Comment: For some time open-literature enclosures have been given the same classification as the covering OO-B report, by your direction. Contact Division recommends, however, that enclosures be permitted to seek their natural security level, down to and including RESTRICTED, without regard for the classification on the covering OO-B report.

"e. Report back to the requestor on the status of a requirement when delays are experienced in the collection of the desired information."

Comment: The mechanics of such regular status reports would be formidable. If the direct liaison proposed in paragraph 3a(2) of the 7 August letter is approved, informal status reports can be rendered in that fashion.

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MANAGEMENT STAFF STUDY OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY DIVISION  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Findings:

The inter-departmental character of this activity has created a hiatus between this Division and other Agency activities. This separation has given rise to conflicting opinions as to the responsibilities of the Division and the extent to which Agency policy should govern the activities of the Division. (See Tabs 1, 2, 2A and 2B.)

a. The requirements of the regional and functional divisions of the Agency's production offices for basic intelligence are not fully covered. (See Tab 1 and also Tab 2A of the Regional Division Staff Study.)

b. The criticisms of Chapter Sections by production analysts in the Office of Reports and Estimates are not fully reconciled. (See Tab 1 and also Tab 2B of the Regional Division Staff Study.)

c. The regional and functional analysts of the production offices do not participate in formulation of requirements for or in the maintenance phase of the National Intelligence Survey Program. (See Tab 1.)

d. Dissemination of the finished product is effected under policies established by the Program's Inter-departmental Committee and is administered by the Agency's National Intelligence Survey Division rather than under Agency policies established and administered by the Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. (See Tabs 1, 1A, and 1B.)

Likewise the inter-departmental nature of this activity is responsible for the administrative difficulties experienced within this Division. (See Tab 1.)

a. The formal organization and staffing pattern of the Division is not operative in the day-to-day work activity of the Division. (See Tab 1.)

b. The shortcomings of Chapter contributors have required time-consuming review at the expense of the more important coordination function. (See Tab 1.)

c. A considerable amount of time is devoted to maintenance of control and progress records. (See Tab 1.)

Recommendations:

1. The National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 be rewritten to clarify Agency responsibilities in the National Intelligence Survey Program. (See Tabs 1 and 2.)

2. Inter-departmental action be taken to provide maximum support, recognition, and competence in the National Intelligence Survey activities of the governmental agencies charged with Chapter and Section responsibilities. (See Tabs 1 and 2.)

3. Dissemination of the National Intelligence Survey be recognized as an Agency function and such dissemination be effected in accordance with Agency policies. (See Tabs 1 and 2.)

Basic Documents Relating to the Study:

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Tab 1 - The Management Study with Attachments A and B.

Tab 2 - Comments of the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates on the Study

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July 18, 1950

Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

Management Officer

Management Staff Study of National Intelligence Survey Division, ORE.

1. A Management Staff study of National Intelligence Survey Division of ORE during the week of 3 July 1950 generally found D/NIS to be a well-administered, efficient organization. The staff was well-oriented, specific assignments had been made to each staff member, and such assignments were being effectively executed. The staff members expressed enthusiasm for their jobs and harmonious relationships appeared to exist. The considerable amount of work processed by this Division during the past year likewise testifies to the efficiency of the organization.

2. Findings:

a. The activity of D/NIS is limited to that phase of basic intelligence which is contained within the framework of intelligence objectives and outline of the National Intelligence Survey Program. No consideration has been given to the provision for and coordination of basic intelligence support outside the purview of the NIS Program, which may be required by CIA and other intelligence agencies of the Federal Government.

b. Coordination responsibilities exercised by D/NIS have been exclusively related to coordination of the production of component parts of the NIS publications being produced in designated agencies of the Federal Government, including three organizational units of CIA. Little attention has been given to coordinating:

(1) ORE regional and functional division requirements by specific geographic area for basic intelligence.

(2) The support to be rendered to contributing agencies of the NIS Program by OO and OCD.

(3) For budget purposes all phases of CIA production and support rendered the NIS Program.

c. Responsibility for policy decisions concerning the NIS Program are vested in an NIS Committee composed of representatives of agencies represented on the IAC, with CIA chairmanship of such Committee. Policy determinations regarding the scope of NIS activity are referred by this Committee, through the Director of Central Intelligence, to the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the National Security Council, when applicable. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations are generally solicited and followed. Also, Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations are the basis of the priorities established for production of NIS publications. Responsibilities have been

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assigned to specific agencies for Chapter coordination of production . General outlines for Chapters and Sections have been established by the NIS Committee Responsibilities for definition of substantive content of Sections to be covered within the general outline framework for each geographic area have been delegated to the contributing agencies. Likewise, responsibilities for determination of accuracy of substantive content rest with the agencies assigned responsibility for Chapter coordination, although the NIS is generally considered as a CIA publication. Delegations as set forth above give little consideration to priority of production and coverage required for certain CIA intelligence activities and the interests of other agencies such as the National Security Resources Board.

d. Problems encountered in the production of NIS materials by contributing agencies are well-expressed in the annual report now being prepared by the Chief, National Intelligence Survey Division. Briefly these problems include:

- (1) Poorly qualified personnel in contributing agencies.
- (2) Inadequate staffs in contributing agencies.
- (3) Division of staff time between NIS production and departmental projects, as governed by pressure of Agency workload.
- (4) Inadequate Agency support of the NIS Program, particularly at the high-levels.
- (5) Noncompliance with assigned deadlines.
- (6) Insufficient exploitation of available data.
- (7) Deficiencies in field collection capabilities

e. Working effort within D/NIS is devoted to control of and reporting on progress of total production effort, to final review of finished Sections of NIS Chapters submitted by Chapter coordinators for publication, and to processing materials through the various publication phases resulting in final publication of the finished product.

- (1) A considerable amount of time is devoted to maintenance of controls and preparation of statistical charts and graphs to report production progress.
- (2) Review of Sections submitted by contributing agencies has been time-consuming and difficult, largely because of lack of uniformity in copy received and inadequate editing within the contributing agencies. These deficiencies can largely be attributed to "growing pains" and it is expected that copy received will improve as contributors learn about former mistakes and uniform standards

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are adopted. As copy improves, so will the production of NIS editors. Presently, a small backlog exists. Also, the character of the editorial task will change from less review to more coordination and guidance of the product during its initial stages.

(3) D/NIS has made excellent progress in codifying editorial instructions and establishing editorial policies and standards. A fairly comprehensive guide is now in the hands of contributing agencies. The reproduction processes used (ditto and mimeograph) detract from usefulness of the guide because of difficulties in reading and limitations on numbers of copies which can be supplied to the contributing agencies.

(4) While each Section of the NIS is sent to appropriate ORE and OSI regional and functional divisions for review and comment, this action is not contributing too greatly to the quality of the finished product. This can be attributed to D/NIS policy of yielding to the contributor when viewpoints of ORE-OSI reviewing analyst and the contributor cannot be reconciled, to marginal interest and participation of ORE analysts in the NIS Program, and to no provision for expressing non-concurrence in the finished draft.

(5) Presently, ORE-OSI regional and functional analysts have assumed little responsibility for initiation or control of requirements for collection resulting from gaps and unreconciled factors included in the NIS. This responsibility has resided with the contributing Agency. Likewise, little provision has been made within CIA to solicit cooperation of ORE and OSI reviewing analysts in directing pertinent data to be included in subsequent revisions of NIS Sections to the attention of D/NIS.

(6) Publication Branch, while not responsible for original graphic and cartographic effort, has, by reason of serious deficiencies in the contributing agencies (except CIA), expended considerable graphic effort not envisioned in this Program. Fluctuations in personnel and lack of experience in the contributing agencies is being overcome by constant liaison to insure adequacy of materials initially.

(7) Information Control presently maintains one complete set of published NIS materials in addition to the two sets maintained elsewhere within D/NIS. As the production of these materials increases, problems of safe-files and space will become acute.

f. Dissemination of the NIS product has been effected under policies established by the NIS Inter-departmental Committee and administered by D/NIS. OCD has performed the physical tasks of distribution and maintenance under the direction and supervision of D/NIS. Presently, COAPS has recommended that NIS dissemination be effected under Agency policies established and administered by AD/OCD. Much discussion has been held with little understanding of the basic difference of opinion regarding this dissemination picture. (See Tab A, memorandum for Acting Executive from Chief, COAPS, titled "NIS Publications", dated 15 May 1950; and Tab B, memorandum to AD/ORE from Chief, D/NIS, titled "NIS Publications", dated 23 May 1950.)

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g. The dissemination problem discussed in the preceding paragraph and other findings relating to the non-integration of the NIS activity into the CIA intelligence operation stem from one unanswered question, namely, "Is the NIS an intelligence product of CIA for which CIA must accept responsibility as to quality, coverage, accuracy, and dissemination?" Chief, D/NIS contends that the NIS is not a CIA product, but the product of the various contributors, with each contributor exercising full and final judgment as to the content, quality, and dissemination of its product. He further believes that CIA responsibilities are limited to the mechanical tasks of coordinating production activity and of effecting final publication. Yet, within the intelligence community, even by the officials of contributing agencies, the NIS is considered and referred to as a CIA product. While NSCID No. 3 states in paragraph 1a (4) "in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned," paragraph 1a (5) states "The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for accomplishing the editing, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys . . . ." (Underscoring added.)

h. Organizational structures of the Office of the Chief and of the Editorial Branch appear adequate for present operations. It was noted that personnel assigned from the IAC at times served in other than assigned positions, but this appears to be the best utilization of their working effort. The workload of the three editorial sections vary so considerable that no effort can presently be made to adjust the strength between sections to reflect workload. The table of organization of Publication Branch as presently constituted is not being followed in performance of activities. Editorial functions are now being performed as a unit and not split into sections as indicated on the present T/O.

3. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. The recommendations contained in memoranda to you titled "Management Study of Regional Divisions of ORE", dated 14 July 1950, and "Factors to be Reconciled Between the NIS Program and the Basic Economic Research Activity of Eastern Europe Division, ORE", dated 14 July 1950, concerning basic research be implemented. Such implementation would provide closer integration of ORE activity in the field of basic intelligence and definition of the support responsibilities of ORE for the NIS Program.

b. Future budget presentations for the NIS Program activity within CIA include mention of the support responsibilities, not only of ORE, but also of OCD divisions and Foreign Documents Division of the Office of Operations.

c. The problems set forth by Chief, D/NIS, in his annual report which relate to coordination of the production effort with the agencies represented on the IAC be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence, when necessary, and such other action as can be taken within ORE be effected to resolve the acknowledged problems.

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d. Immediate consideration be given to revise NSCID No. 3 to clarify CIA position as to whether the NIS is a product of CIA with the assistance of the intelligence agencies or whether CIA is in a secondary position to the NIS Interdepartmental Committee.

e. The working effort of the editors of D/NIS continue to be directed toward coordination of the NIS production in its drafting stages through providing training and guidance to the working-levels of the contributing agencies, thus enabling the initial production of higher-quality drafts which would require less editorial review. Also this type of coordination should substantially reduce the time-lag between cut-off date and publication date of the NIS Sections.

f. The editorial guides be further developed and be printed in greater number of copies and in a more finished and usable form. (Note: During the course of the survey, it was suggested that paper offset mats be used, rather than ditto masters or stencils, in preparation of final draft.)

g. A procedure be established which will provide for the issuance of collection requirements by ORE reviewing analysts to provide data on controversial statements appearing in NIS publications or omissions, when such action is not taken by the contributing agencies. Also, that provision be made for indicating possible discrepancies in published NIS Sections. Likewise, provision should be made for inclusion in NIS maintenance files of D/NIS of newly collected data received by ORE reviewing analysts, which data may require incorporation in revisions of NIS Sections.

h. The employment of machine record facilities in the maintenance of control and statistical records be explored.

i. Dissemination of the NIS be recognized as a CIA function and such dissemination be effected in accordance with CIA dissemination policies, with due consideration being given to the desires of contributing agencies.

j. The Publication Branch T/O be realigned as follows:

Publication Branch

Chief	1 GS-12
Assistant for Graphics(Liaison)	1 GS-9
Assistant for Maps (Liaison)	1 GS-9
Clerk-stenographer	1 GS-4

Publication Section

Cartographer(Assistant for Publications)	1 GS-11
Editorial Clerk	1 GS-6
Editorial Clerk	3 GS-5
Editorial Clerk	3 GS-4

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Production Section

Cartographer(Assistant for Pro-  
duction)

1 GS-9

Illustrator


3 GS-7

Illustrator

6 GS-6

Publication Branch Total: 22

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Attachments: Tab A and Tab B

cc: Acting Executive  
Chief, COAPS  
Budget Officer

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TAB "A"

15 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive

SUBJECT: NIS Publications

1. We recognize the importance of the NIS basic intelligence publication, but our discussions over a period of months have been about the real current need for such a large number of the NIS now being produced, distributed and stored, and the expenses in producing them at this time.

2. We understand that the JANIS publications totalled 3,000 copies each. Warehouses are now filled with unused copies. When the NIS replaced JANIS, 1,200 copies were published including the 150 copies which [redacted] This number is now down to 800 and it is hoped that 750 copies will be adequate in July in place of the present 800, and it may be possible to bring it down to 600. The Navy, for example, recently cut its "requirements" from 300 to 150. The present largest "requirements" are:

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[redacted]	- 150 copies
Army	- 100 "
Navy	- 150 "
Air	- 146 "
State	- 13 "

From this number they can maintain two or three complete sets and many dozens of separate sections so that this publication can probably be used in each agency by many hundreds of people. We think that nowhere near that many people need copies for current use.

3. One master set with necessary negatives for maps and cuts will be kept by CIA for use in rapid reproduction to meet future emergency needs, when a large number of copies will undoubtedly be useful. The Chief, Reproduction Branch of CIA's Services Division, Administrative Staff has assured us that the present reproduction system is best, rather than changing to a duplimat system in storing the stencils for future use.

4. CIA will also keep some published extra copies for current and future unforeseen needs (not of an emergency nature). Instead of the present 40 bound copies and 40 unbound copies in this extra stock, we think

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that a very few number of bound copies and a very few dozen extra copies unbound (to the nearest 50 in the printed run) will be enough until the emergency comes.

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5. If 150 of the printed run of 800 is adequate  we still think that a much smaller number than the present would be adequate for the United States.

6. Accordingly COAPS recommends that:

a. The NIS Division of the Office of Reports and Estimates in the CIA and the NIS interdepartmental Committee devote themselves to the substantive production of the National Intelligence Surveys and give up factors pertaining to the distribution of their end product.

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b. OCD survey the components of CIA again and also the outside agencies (members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and eventually maybe other Government departments) to determine how few (not how many) copies of the NIS are now really needed in printed form for current needs (both bound and unbound). Maybe the 150 now distributed  can also be cut down. It should be taken into consideration that an unbound set can be divided for use by many different components who work for complementary or different parts of the world and do not overlap. It should be noted that such basic intelligence publications undoubtedly are not consulted daily by the users; so a small section can easily borrow this publication when necessary from a nearby larger section in the same agency. Every office does NOT need its own copy of this voluminous and expensive publication or even the section pertaining to its own country when such a section is readily enough available for its use when needed. This determination should also be based on (1) the small reserve stock maintained in CIA and (2) the fact that CIA will print additional copies to satisfy utilization needs. (Paragraphs 3 and 4 above)

/s/

PRESCOTT CHILDS, Chief  
Coordination, Operations  
and Policy Staff

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COPY

TAB "B"

To: Assistant Director, ORE 23 May 1950

From: Chief, NIS Division, ORE

Subject: NIS Publications

Reference: Memorandum, Chief, COAPS, dated 15 May 1950,  
to Acting Executive, CIA, subject as above.

1. It appears that the purport of the above-cited reference is tacit admission by COAPS of the correctness of the ORE position as set forth in the memorandum of AD/ORE, 27 March 1950, to Chief, COAPS, Subject: "NIS Program - Curtailment of Scheduled Reproduction of Copies for Dissemination and Storage".

2. The meaning of Paragraph 6a is unclear. From the beginning, the Chiefs of the IAC Agencies have looked to their representatives on the NIS Committee to act as their spokesmen on matters pertaining to NIS dissemination requirements as well as all other NIS matters. The CIA representative on the NIS Committee, being concurrently Chief, D/NIS, is charged with the control of publication of the NIS and hence, must be constantly and currently familiar with over-all dissemination requirements. In short, policy control of dissemination of the NIS has always been considered, and logically so, a major function of the NIS Committee. The mechanics of dissemination, including the conduct of survey requirements, has always been the function of the dissemination components in the IAC Agencies and OCD in CIA.

3. To date, no survey of the NIS requirements of non-intelligence Government agencies has been made. Thus far, only the Department of Commerce has taken the initiative in requesting certain NIS elements and is receiving these elements. It is believed, however, that there may be other such agencies which have legitimate requirements for the NIS but are unaware of their existence. Hence, it is intended in the near future to have OCD conduct a requirements survey of the more important of these agencies. (NOTE: This matter was discussed by the NIS Committee on 9 May 1950.) The additional requirements determined by this survey will operate to reduce the reserve stock of unbound copies of NIS now on hand.

4. COAPS has already twice taken up the matter of reduction of NIS requirements directly with the IAC Agencies: once through agency members of COAPS and once by memorandum of the DCI dated 9 February 1950 to the

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Chiefs of Intelligence of the Agencies. It is felt that a reopening of the issue with the IAC Agencies would be inappropriate, since these Agencies have already made reply to the DCI that they are keeping the matter under continuing review.

5. There is no objection to resurvey by OCD of the requirements of other recipients of NIS, including the CIA. This survey will be requested by D/NIS at the same time as the survey of non-intelligence Agencies indicated in Paragraph 3 above.

(SIGNED)

[Redacted Signature Box]

per EM

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1st Ind.

24 May 1950

To: Chief, COAPS

1. Approved and forwarded.

(SIGNED) THEODORE BABBITT  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

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
7 August 1950

MEMORANDUM TO MANAGEMENT OFFICER

SUBJECT: Management Staff Study of National  
Intelligence Survey Division, ORE

1. This Office concurs in the attached memorandum from the Chief, D/NIS, commenting on the subject Management Staff Study of that division.

2. Two copies of the D/NIS comments are forwarded herewith for your information and such action as you may deem desirable.

  
THEODORE BABBITT  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

FOIAB3B

Enclosures

Aug 11 1950

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Assistant Director, ORE

3 August 1950

Chief, NIS Division, ORE

Comments on Management Survey Report

- REFERENCES: A. Memo of Management Officer to AD/ORE, dated 18 July 1950, Subject: Management Staff Study of National Intelligence Survey Division, ORE (Enclosed)
- B. Memo of Management Officer to AD/ORE, dated 14 July 1950 - Discussion of Management Staff Study of Regional Divisions which are of concern to Chief, D/NIS.

1. As a preface to comments on specific points raised in the report of the Management Officer on D/NIS operations and the NIS Program, a brief review of this program appears to be necessary in order that there may be a complete understanding of all the facts bearing upon the issues involved.

2. The NIS Program has been implemented in strict compliance with the provisions of NSCID No. 3, dated 13 January 1948. The specific provisions of this directive that are relevant in the present case are as follows:

a. "An outline of all basic intelligence required by the Government shall be prepared by the CIA in collaboration with the appropriate agencies."

b. "This outline shall be broken down into chapters, sections, and sub-sections which shall be allocated as production and maintenance responsibilities to CIA and those agencies of the Government which are best qualified by reason of their intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interest to assume the production and maintenance responsibility."

c. "Changes in the outline or allocations shall be effected by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned."

d. "The National Intelligence Surveys will be disseminated in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned."

e. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for accomplishing the editing, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys and shall make such requests on the agencies as are necessary for their proper development and maintenance."

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3. An interdepartmental ad hoc committee, with the CIA member designated as chairman, was established by the IAC to consider and formulate plans for the implementation of the NIS Program. The final report of this committee was approved by the IAC Agencies with a few exceptions on minor points, none of which are germane to present issues. The Director of Central Intelligence in DCI 3/1, dated 8 July 1948, directed that the Basic Intelligence program be conducted in accordance with procedures developed and agreed upon by the interdepartmental ad hoc committee.

4. The approved report of the ad hoc committee, as amended, provides for the establishment of a permanent NIS Committee with the CIA member as Chairman and defines the functions of this committee and of the IAC Agencies as follows:

a. NIS Committee

(1) The NIS Committee consists of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chiefs of the Intelligence Agencies of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The representative of the Director of Central Intelligence is ex officio chairman of the committee. It also includes an advisory member from the Joint Staff who shall:

(a) Be thoroughly familiar with the basic intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

(b) Keep the JCS informed of the progress of the NIS Program.

(c) Keep the NIS Committee informed of changes in the JCS requirements.

(2) The NIS Committee performs the following functions:

(a) Considers and recommends for Intelligence Agency approval over-all policies for the NIS Program.

(b) Determines the scope and treatment of each NIS to be produced.

(c) Allocates responsibility for production and maintenance of NIS in accordance with the intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interest of the Intelligence Agencies concerned.

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(d) Establishes NIS production and maintenance schedules based upon JCS priorities and agency capabilities.

(e) Promulgates procedures and instructions for the preparation, review, editing, and submission of NIS contributions.

(f) Recommends to CIA measures necessary for the coordination of the NIS Program.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency performs the following functions:

(1) Provides over-all coordination of the NIS Program.

(2) Produces those elements of NIS allocated to it for production by the NIS Committee.

(3) Furnishes certain common services which can best be done centrally.

(4) Edits NIS contributions, provides advisory substantive review, and arranges for the publication of NIS.

(5) Disseminates NIS in accordance with Intelligence Agency agreements.

c. The IAC Agencies (State, Army, Navy and Air Force) perform the following functions:

(1) Provide a member and alternate members of the NIS Committee. This member represents, and speaks for, the Chief of the Intelligence Agency of the Department from which he is accredited.

(2) Produce and maintain the NIS elements which have been allocated by the NIS Committee as production responsibilities.

(3) Implement collection effort which may be required for NIS production and maintenance.

d. The non-IAC Agencies perform the following functions:

(1) Produce and maintain portions of NIS when explicitly assigned that responsibility by the NIS

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Committee or by an Intelligence Agency with the approval of that Committee.

(2) Furnish Intelligence Agencies with material for integration into NIS by those agencies.

5. Included as an integral part of the approved ad hoc committee report were the following:

- a. List of NIS Areas
- b. The JCS Priority List
- c. Tentative Allocations of Responsibility for Preparation of the NIS
- d. The NIS Outline and Guide
- e. Standard Editorial Instructions for the NIS

It is worthy of mention at this point that items a, c, d, and e are the products of interdepartmental effort upon which there was complete agreement between CIA and the IAC Agencies.

6. The question of paramount importance is whether or not the NIS is an interdepartmental project or a CIA project. The answer to this question appears to be clear. NSCID No. 3 directs the activation of the NIS Program by the use of such terms as "the CIA in collaboration with the appropriate agencies", "by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned" and, "shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned". At no place in NSCID No. 3 is it stated, or implied, that the NIS is to be a product of "CIA with the assistance of the intelligence agencies". The interdepartmental character of the NIS Program is further recognized by the following actions:

- a. Establishment by the IAC of an interdepartmental ad hoc committee to formulate plans and procedures for the accomplishment of NIS Program objectives.
- b. Approval by the IAC of the final report of the ad hoc committee which recognized and provided for the conduct of the NIS Program as an interdepartmental project.
- c. Issuance of directives by the Director of Central Intelligence requiring conduct of the NIS Program in accordance with the approved report of the ad hoc committee.

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From its inception it is evident that the NIS Program has been considered by the NSC as an interdepartmental project; that it has been so considered by the IAC, the Director of Central Intelligence, and all those who have had an active part in the implementation of this program.

7. The allocation of production and maintenance responsibilities was made to "CIA and those agencies of the Government which are best qualified by reason of their intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interest." In those fields where CIA meets these requirements the allocation has been assigned to CIA, such as in the case of Map Division, ORE. Later, OSO/CIA requested allocation of Section 56 "Intelligence and Security" which was originally assigned to OIR/State, and this was eventually done. OSI/CIA was repeatedly requested to assume a more active part in the production of Chapter VII contributions. It was only recently that OSI accepted responsibility for coordination of Chapter VII and specific allocation of production for Sections 70 and 73 of that Chapter. In short, there is ample opportunity for CIA to assume production and maintenance responsibilities under the NIS Program where it is the best qualified by reason of the aforementioned conditions.

8. The Management Officer contends that Regional Divisions in ORE should assume responsibilities which they do not have. The Chief, D/NIS has consistently held that, in those fields of basic intelligence where CIA does not have primary responsibility, its position properly is an advisory and coordinating one and not a controlling one. That this procedure is eminently successful is attested by the contributors' acceptance of all fundamental and supportable comments arising out of the review by D/NIS and the Regional and Functional Divisions of ORE. Quantitatively, 65% of all contributions received during the past year have been given major revisions by the contributors as a result of this reviewing process. Moreover, the large majority of instances in which the Regional Division comments have not been accepted by the contributors were due to new information arriving after the cut-off date. The heavy work load and lack of agency capabilities made it infeasible in those instances to extend the cut-off date without seriously affecting the production schedule as a whole. As emphasized to the Management Officer during the course of his survey of D/NIS, this situation will gradually be improved as production flow and agency capabilities become better balanced. This has been considered at some length in the "Report of the NIS Program - Fiscal Year 1950".

9. Were CIA to "call the turn" on substantive matters, it would either have to assume complete responsibility for the NIS or attach dissenting opinions throughout the publication. The former alternative is not possible without considerable augmentation of ORE necessary for the rewriting of contributions and for the research staff to check all basic data. For instance, to do this for "ports and naval facilities" would require the maintenance of files and the availability of specialists commensurate with those now producing this material in Navy. As for the latter alternative, CIA would be placed in

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the position of tacitly approving all the material in a contribution to which it did not dissent. Since the contributing agency does have responsibility allocated to it for designated categories of basic intelligence, it is only logical that where there are differences of viewpoint, not subject to precise confirmation, the contributing agency's view prevail. Moreover, there are many categories of intelligence in which ORE has no real capabilities, such as oceanography, coasts and landing beaches, and armed forces. In the last analysis, there is no basis under present directives to permit CIA's views to prevail over those of an IAC Agency in a category of basic intelligence where that agency has allocation of production responsibility. The efforts of the NIS Coordinator have been directed toward strengthening those agencies, coordinating their activities, and in providing editorial and substantive guidance to the extent of CIA's capabilities.

COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT

10. Recommendation a

The "Management Study of Regional Divisions of ORE" has been previously commented on in this report. As to the "Factors to be Reconciled Between the NIS Program and the Basic Economic Research Activity of Eastern European Division, ORE", the below comments refer to subparagraphs of Paragraph 6:

a. The "Standard Instructions for the NIS" have been made available to all Divisions of ORE in amounts which they have requested. These Standard Instructions contain the Outlines and Outline Guides, the Allocation of Production Responsibilities, the NIS Areas, Editorial Instructions, and the current Production Schedule.

b. Economic values in the NIS have been standardized to a practical extent by inter-agency agreement. It is not feasible to standardize all economic values for all areas. Where there is variation in the values, D/EE has opportunity to comment upon contributions received for review.

c. The priority of production assignment cannot be geared to every Regional Division or to every Intelligence Agency. For that reason, JCS priorities are used as the basis for NIS production. This principle has been approved by the DCI, the IAC and the NSC. As a matter of fact, all areas of interest to the D/EE are in the highest priority category. The regional set-up in the contributing agencies, however, makes it necessary to produce NIS on other areas simultaneously in order that full utilization of area specialists may be had.

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d. Copies of the "Allocation of Production Responsibilities" have been made available to D/EE. These show the agencies of the Government which are participating in the NIS Program.

e. All contributors to the NIS Program are encouraged to seek out information and expert opinion from their own agencies and other agencies of the Government, including CIA.

f. Pre-publication drafts are available to any component of CIA upon valid requirements. D/EE analysts have had such drafts made available to them on several occasions. D/NIS does not automatically leave such drafts in the Regional Divisions in the interests of reducing unnecessary dissemination of incomplete and unfinished intelligence materials.

g. D/EE as well as other Divisions of ORE have direct liaison with all agencies contributing to the NIS Program. Through these channels, they can procure basic intelligence required by them. Contributing agencies are responsible for initiating revisions of NIS for which they are responsible when there is sufficient new information to warrant such revisions.

Referring to Paragraph 7, the Management Officer says, "Consideration should be given to institution of procedures for coordination of these two basic intelligence efforts. Such actions would eliminate costly duplication of effort within the Federal Government and would enhance the quality of the intelligence product".

Comment: Representatives of the Economic Division, ORE, assisted the inter-agency committee in formulating the intelligence requirements of NIS Chapter VI "Economic". Since then there has been no indication that the Economic Branch of D/EE is dissatisfied with the NIS requirements or that it has capability to assume the production responsibility for this Chapter on the Soviet orbit, which is currently allocated to CIR/State with the assistance of the Armed Forces Agencies and the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. If such capability does in fact exist and if this is considered to be a proper function of an ORE Regional Division, the Chief, D/NIS, should be so informed in order that this matter may be laid before the NIS Committee for initial consideration and recommendation regarding reallocation of production responsibility.

11. Recommendation b

Each Office of CIA has been including NIS support in its own budget proposals. D/NIS does not see what advantages would accrue from this recommendation, but does not object to it.

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12. Recommendation e

This recommendation has been carried out as a matter of course.

13. Recommendation d

This recommendation has been dealt with at some length in preceding commentary. In brief, NSCID No. 3 clearly indicates that the NIS Program is a joint production and maintenance effort to which CIA, the IAC Agencies, and other Government agencies each contribute in accordance with its intelligence requirements, production capabilities and dominant interest; and that the DCI is responsible for coordinating production and maintenance, and for accomplishing the editing, publication, and dissemination of the NIS. In consequence, the NIS is not a product of CIA alone; it is a coordinated product in which CIA assumes the role of contributor and coordinator, and performs services of common concern.

14. Recommendation e

This recommendation reflects the mission which the editors of D/NIS have had from the inception of the NIS Program.

15. Recommendation f

Full requirements for editorial instructions have been satisfied. When all recommendations for changes and revisions have been received, the final instructions will be reproduced in a more finished and usable form.

16. Recommendation g

This recommendation is divided into three categories, namely: a) collection requirements; b) discrepancies in published NIS; and c) NIS Maintenance files.

In respect to a), the contributing agencies are now charged with the responsibility for initiating collection requests for gaps in the contributions for which they have allocation of production. The Intelligence Agencies of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force have issued directives to their field activities to implement this matter. Divisions of ORE may at any time issue collection requirements on matters at issue in the NIS. Current collection procedures provide for checking such requirements to ensure that duplicate collection requests are not sent to the field.

In respect to b) above, the directives of contributing agencies to their field activities provide for checking discrepancies in published NIS.

In respect to c) above, it is considered that any attempt to provide adequate maintenance files in D/NIS is wholly infeasible. That is a valid

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responsibility of the contributing agencies who have the staffs and the voluminous files necessary to do a proper maintenance job, and which they do as a matter of course in their day to day operations.

17. Recommendation h

This recommendation is concurred in. However, the statistical records maintained in D/NIS will be further simplified to minimize the work load whether it be done by hand or by machine methods.

18. Recommendation i

25X1X7 The question raised by Management Officer respecting the dissemination of the NIS echoes the question raised by COAPS, which was commented upon by Chief, D/NIS in memorandum to AD/ORE of 23 May 1950. Initially, COAPS was concerned about the number of copies of the NIS which were being disseminated. Excluding the 150 copies to [ ] which requirement, incidentally, was reached in agreement between the Director and [ ] the 25X1X7 dissemination requirements of the NIS are determined by the sum total of the individual requirements of the Intelligence Agencies, the other Defense Agencies, and certain non-Intelligence Agencies which OCD is now surveying. Apparently, COFAS considers that CIA should determine the dissemination requirements of the recipients of the NIS without reference to the latter's own wishes, for in COAPS' memorandum to AD/ORE and AD/OCD, dated 14 March 1950, it states, "it is the opinion of COAPS that the original publication of the NIS for peacetime use should be limited to a maximum of 100 copies". After learning some of the facts at issue, COAPS by later memorandum of 15 May 1950, states, "If 150 of the printed run of 800 is adequate for [ ] we still think that a much smaller number than the present would be adequate for the United States". On two occasions COAPS has taken up the matter of reduction of NIS requirements directly with the IAC Agencies, and both times the replies have indicated that the Chiefs of these agencies, through the medium of their NIS Committee members, were keeping the matter under continuing review. Recommendation of the Management Officer is that "Dissemination of the NIS be recognized as a CIA function and such dissemination be effected in accordance with CIA dissemination policies, with due consideration being given to the desires of contributing agencies". (Underline added.) In effect, that reflects what is now being done through the medium of the NIS Committee, which determines the desires of the contributing agencies and so informs OCD. NIS dissemination policies can only be determined by reference to the contributing agencies, since it is their intelligence which is being disseminated. For those sections which CIA is contributing, the dissemination policy is determined by CIA, specifically OCD and I&SS. The present procedures for the dissemination of NIS are sound and operate to the mutual benefit of all agencies concerned. Moreover, they are consonant with present directives and policies.

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19. Recommendation j

Management Officer correctly states that, "The table of organization of Publication Branch as presently constituted is not being following in performance of activities". The principle reasons for this are: first, that the Publication Branch has never been staffed sufficiently to permit section organization as called for by the T/O; and second, that the incoming contributions have varied so much in quantity and quality as to require a very fluid organization to meet the situation. A similar situation has existed in the Editorial Branch as well. When NIS production flow stabilizes it is considered that the present organization of D/NIS will be more sound and workable than the recommended one. No changes should be made until experience has indicated what these changes should be. Moreover, there are major questions of policy respecting the NIS Program which are now before the Director for his decision and that of the TAC. The nature of those decisions will affect the rate of NIS production which in turn will have direct bearing on the size and composition of D/NIS. In consequence, it is recommended that no action be taken on the reorganization of the Publications Branch until these matters have been settled.

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Enclosed:

Reference A. (With original only)

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Executive

DATE: 20 September 1950

FROM : Management Officer

SUBJECT: Review of Comments of the Chief, National Intelligence Survey  
Division on Management Staff Study.

- Reference: A. Comments of Chief, National Intelligence Survey  
Division on Management Staff Study, dated 3 August  
1950.
- B. Management Staff Study on National Intelligence  
Survey Division, Office of Reports and Estimates,  
dated 18 July 1950.

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1. Attached as Reference A are the comments of [ ] which include a complete review and explanation of the concepts and inner workings of the National Intelligence Survey program, together with quotations from all the basic documents, such as NSCID No. 3 and the DCID's, pertinent thereto.

2. Management feels that its recommendations contained in the basic study Reference B are not only soundly conceived, but are practicable. For example, Management stand on the fact that the Publication Branch, National Intelligence Survey Division, was not operating as constituted on the table of organization structure was that the table of organization should be amended accordingly. Chief, National Intelligence Survey Division replied "the table of organization for the Publication Branch is not being following in performance of activities". Despite this acknowledgment, [ ] recommends that no action be taken toward Branch reorganization.

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3. In essence most of these matters are relatively minor, the major portion of the problem rests in a decision as to who is responsible for the substantive content and distribution of National Intelligence Survey materials. According to the Chief, National Intelligence Survey Division, verbally and by the attached paper, the National Intelligence Survey program is not the responsibility of CIA, but of the National Intelligence Survey Committee, chaired by the Chief, National Intelligence Survey Division. This would seem to create a situation wherein a subordinate of the Director is superior thereto, and such a concept is both confusing and conflicting.

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4. In Paragraph 6 of Reference A, [ ] states: "The question of paramount importance is whether or not the National Intelligence Survey is an interdepartmental project or a CIA project. The answer to this question appears to be clear." The Chief, National Intelligence Survey Division then quotes NSCID No. 3. It is obvious that his interpretation regarding CIA responsibility of the National

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Intelligence Survey program and that of this Staff are diametrically opposed.

5. Management need not reiterate the old argument on dissemination, except to state that in our experience most recipients refer to National Intelligence Survey materials as CIA publications, and hold this Agency accountable for its substantive content and distribution. This Staff has never indicated, nor suggested, that the National Intelligence Survey Committee or the IAC Agencies should not exercise some influence on the dissemination of the end product. The dissemination authority currently in the National Intelligence Survey Division is contrary to the Director's explicit instructions that all dissemination functions of intelligence materials are charged to the Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination.



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MAP DIVISION  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Findings:

In general, this Division was found to be well-defined, efficiently administered and operationally sound. During the survey, improved arrangements were effected for the receipt and handling of materials utilized by this Division. Continuing attention should be given to certain aspects of this Division's operations:

- a. Clarification of functional relationships with the Office of Scientific Intelligence to effect maximum support to Scientific Intelligence with no duplication of effort. (See Tabs 1 and 1A.)
- b. Provision for orienting other segments of the Agency in the services provided by Map Division and conversely for orienting Map Division personnel in operations of the other segments of CIA. (See Tab 1.)
- c. Simplification of control and catalog procedures and records. (See Tabs 1, 1E, 1F, and 2.)

Recommendations:

1. Enhance production planning of Map Division operations and the further integration of Map Division production with other production of the Office of Reports and Estimates through:

- a. Providing for Map Division representation on the Estimates Production Board. (effected)
- b. Publications Division providing Map Division with notice of all newly received production projects. (effected)
- c. Developing and implementing an over-all intelligence production plan. (See Tab 1.)

2. Utilize newly-developed office machines, such as the "Thermofax", to reduce workload of the Division. (See Tab 1.)

3. Simplify control and catalog procedures; particularly, install the simplified catalog procedure developed during the course of the survey. (See Tab 1E.) Note: Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates concurred. (See Tab 2.)

Basic Documents Relating to the Study:

Tab 1 - The Management Study with Attachments A through G.

Tab 2 - Comments of the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates on the Study.

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

DATE: MAY 15 1950

FROM : Management Officer

SUBJECT: Management Staff Survey of Map Division, ORE

1. The Management Staff survey of Map Division, Office of Reports and Estimates, discloses a well defined, efficiently administered and for the most part operationally sound component of CIA. The functional statements for the Map Division are attached as Exhibit "A".
2. The majority of the personnel, within the three branches comprising the Division, have been associated with this function through its various parent organizations.
3. Internal reorganizations within the Division, relocation of operations and institution of revised operating procedures as described in this report will assist the Division in attaining maximum efficiency of operations.
4. Problems involved in transition of the Division from the Department of State to CIA have, for the most part, been resolved. However, complete understanding or utilization of the Division's capabilities have not been enjoyed by all components of the Agency.
5. Map Division personnel have, in some instances, been handicapped by not clearly understanding the functional responsibilities and operations of other Offices of the Agency.
6. Physical separation of the Map Division from the other producing offices of the Agency has incurred a hardship. New location of Map Intelligence Branch and Cartography Branch in Building No. 11 will facilitate working level liaison.
7. On-the-spot indoctrination of Map Division personnel in the service facilities of the Office of Collection and Dissemination will assist Map Division in the fulfillment of their functions.
8. CIA and other Government Agencies requirements for maps and map intelligence data are currently being coordinated by the Map Division. Specific requests or materials in the form of "want-lists" are processed directly to Department of State for transmittal to Foreign Service Geographic Attaches under authority of the Chief, Map Division, ORE, who serves as Special Assistant for Maps, Department of State. Other collection channels are utilized when appropriate.

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9. The Inter-Agency Map Procurement Coordination Committee chaired by Chief, Procurement and Reference Branch, includes: Aeronautical Chart Service, Library of Congress, Hydrographic Office, Army Map Service, Costal Geodetic Survey, Geological Survey and Board of Geographic Names. This Committee meets monthly to discuss area of map procurement priority and to resolve problems in this field.

10. A project control committee composed of the Chief, Map Division, and the three branch chiefs meet weekly to define Division priorities.

a. Weekly priorities are broken down to section level and in Map Intelligence Branch by individuals within the sections.

b. Project proposals are submitted to this committee in writing by the branch chiefs.

c. The composition and continuance of this committee represents an extremely well devised method of project control and effective determination of workload assignments.

11. It has been recommended by the Chief, Map Division, and concurred in by the Management Staff, that Map Division representation on the Estimates Production Board together with notification of project initiation by the Publications Division will prove advantageous in Agency intelligence production.

12. The institution of the over-all Intelligence Production Plan for CIA will assist the Project Control Committee, Map Division, not only in determination of priorities to be assigned individual items of production, but also in planning for self-initiated production.

13. Dissemination of CIA Telephone Directory has been restricted in Map Division to branch chiefs only. This restriction was imposed throughout ORE by former DAD/ORE to reduce the possibility of security violations but has in effect created individual card files maintained by most of the Division personnel. This method is not only time consuming and as large a security potential but defeats the purpose for which the Directory was compiled.

a. The present DAD/ORE concurs with the Management Staff in the relaxation of this ORE restriction.

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14. Inclusion of [ ] on the bus schedule on an hourly basis was suggested by Chiefs of Map Intelligence and Cartography Branches as means of assistance to their personnel having official business to transact with the Procurement and Reference Branch.

15. Map Intelligence Branch

a. The Map Intelligence Branch is composed of the Office of the Chief and six sections: Western Europe, Southeastern Europe, Near East/Africa, USSR, Far East, Latin America and Territorial Studies.

b. Approximately 70 per cent of the production capabilities of the Map Intelligence Branch are currently devoted to the Map and Chart Appraisal, Chapter IX, National Intelligence Surveys Exhibit "B"; 30 per cent (10 per cent CIA, 20 per cent IAC and other) to the preparation of geographic studies, map research bulletins, studies of territorial claims and boundaries, reports on foreign mapping activities and other geographic intelligence.

c. The Branch has certain categories of geographic and locational data of primary interest and responsibility. Discussions with the Office of Scientific Intelligence indicate that OSI wishes the Branch to increase its responsibilities for intelligence in the geophysical field.

(1) This matter will be the subject of a conference with interested parties in the near future. It appears extremely doubtful in view of current substantive intelligence production workload that the Map Intelligence Branch is in a position to accept the additional responsibilities desired by OSI. Action taken by this conference will be transmitted via separate memorandum to AD/ORE as requested.

d. Minor operational difficulties concerning, availability of reference documents, inter-Library loan, procurement have been discussed with Chief, CIA Library, and have either been resolved or in process of solution.

e. Intelligence requirements for OCD readers have been prepared and intelligence data has been transmitted through proper channels to Map Intelligence Branch.

(1) Lack of sufficient copies of reports or attachments thereto, wherein there is a multiplicity of interest, often reach the Map Intelligence Branch after such materials could be utilized within a current project.

(2) Chief, Liaison Division, OCD, is currently undertaking problem of ensuring CIA receipt of at least one copy of attachments to IAC Agencies reports.

(a) Department of State has agreed to disseminate on loan to CIA all attachments to reports containing map data received by Intelligence Acquisition Division.

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f. The Management Staff recommends discontinuance of ditto forms for project controls, in accordance with Administrative Instruction No. [ ] and combining project control and finished production cards into single form as agreed during survey.

g. The balance of files and records are being held to a minimum consistent with operational needs and utilization is made of materials in official CIA repositories.

h. Need for short term retention of certain specific items flowing through the Map Intelligence Branch on a loan, dead-line basis indicates the need for a rapid, branch controlled method of reproduction.

(1) The Management Staff recommends that one Thermo-Fax Machine be procured for joint use by Map Intelligence Branch and Cartography Branch.

i. It is recommended by the Chief, Map Intelligence Branch, and concurred in by the Management Staff that three (3) editorial positions currently assigned to the Office of the Chief be removed and established as the Editorial and Review Section:

Chief	1	GS-13
Editor	2	GS-12
Total	3	

No changes in over-all T/O or grade allocations are necessary in this internal reassignment.

#### 16. Cartography Branch

a. The Cartography Branch is composed of the Office of the Chief, three Compilation Sections, and a Construction Section.

b. Approximately 70 per cent of the production capabilities of the Cartography Branch are currently devoted to the preparation of standard base maps for chapter contributors to National Intelligence Surveys (see Exhibit "C"); final NIS Maps for chapters coordinated by CIA and State Department; and coordinating, checking, arranging for color-proofing, and preparation of printing specifications for NIS multi-color map publications. Additional workload consuming the balance (30 per cent) of available time includes the preparation of maps for CIA reports (MR, SR, ORE) and special requests for the Department of State and other IAC.

c. Close coordination is maintained between the Cartography Branch and National Intelligence Surveys Division (D/NIS), ORE, for the drafting of schedules and adherence to production programs of the NIS projects.

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d. Adequate control systems are currently in effect to assure full knowledge of the many and varied steps of map production. Elimination of one copy of the cover sheet (Form 70-40) attached to work jacket is recommended as discussed during the survey.

e. State Department contributions to Economic and Social Chapters of the NIS program for which Cartography Branch assumes all color map production responsibilities, have caused considerable difficulty because of requested changes in compilation during final construction stages.

(1) Permanent transfer of one person from the Branch to State Department for NIS activity should alleviate this condition.

f. Permanent transfer of one person to D/NIS has assisted Cartography Branch in the fulfillment of its responsibilities in the over-all NIS program.

g. The training program currently in effect for new employees of the Branch afford such individuals an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the methods and techniques of Branch operations to ensure maximum productivity when assigned to current workload.

h. Internal promotional possibilities and criteria for same discussed during survey with Chief, Cartography Branch, and Chief, Personnel Division, Administrative Staff, will be included within over-all "Agency Career Management Program".

i. Relocation of Cartography and Map Intelligence Branches will permit closed liaison between ORE requesters, research personnel of Map Intelligence Branch, and the compilation personnel of Cartography in the production of maps and map intelligence.

#### 17. Procurement and Reference Branch

a. The Procurement and Reference Branch is composed of the Office of the Chief and three sections: Procurement, Processing, and Reference.

##### b. Procurement Section

(1) The Section has as one of its basic responsibilities the coordination of foreign map procurement requirements of federal agencies participating in the Inter-Agency Map Procurement Coordinating Committee.

(2) Continual operational contact is maintained, through the Department of State, with Foreign Service Geographic Attaches in the field. These attaches are given professional direction by the Chief, Map Division, in his capacity as the Department's Special Assistant for Maps.

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
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(3) The Geographic Attaches negotiate with foreign official agencies and private institutions in order to obtain materials on a gift, loan or exchange basis.

(4) Requirements are coordinated with CIA and the IAC Agencies by the Map Division for specific items to satisfy intelligence production or by "want-lists" prepared and disseminated to field officers for collection guidance.

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(8) Current plans for domestic procurement discussed before Committee on 23 February 1950 allow for exploitation of foreign agency publications disseminated directly to organizations within the United States. Procurement of such materials will be accomplished by this Section, exploiting the Washington area as the first phase of this plan.

(9) The operations and methods of control utilized by the Section in the maintenance of exchanges, etc., has proved effective and the personnel function as an operating staff to the Department's Special Assistant for Maps in processing exchange materials.

(10) Certain specific operational problems disclosed during the survey have been solved or are in process of solution:

(a) Problem

OO/B classified reports with map or map intelligence attachments, disseminated to Procurement Section, require that attachments remain classified, even though unclassified duplicates collected through overt channels exist in the collection.

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Solution

Discussion between the Management Staff and Deputy Chief, Contact Division, OO, has resulted in agreement that OO/B reports having map attachments may be declassified and retain OO/B reference number when similar materials to attachments have been procured through overt channels and bear no classification.

(b) Problem

Approximately 50 per cent of all reports in the intelligence flow referring to map attachments are disseminated to the Section without copies of attachments referenced in the covering report. Many of the attachments to IAC Agency reports are received in one copy and disseminated prior to submittal of cover report to CIA.

Solution

Liaison Division, OCD, has received State Department concurrence that reports containing map attachments and related material received in the Intelligence Acquisition Division will be routed through Map Division on loan prior to its dissemination to proper agency.

(c) Problem

Lack of working level liaison with FDD has caused translation service on map names and legends to follow formal pattern of request through OCD channels to FDD.

Solution

Management Staff discussion with Assistant Director for Operations has resolved this problem by authorizing direct contact between Procurement and Reference Branch and FDD personnel and the assignment of single T-number to cover such requests on a continuing basis.

(d) Problem

Map and map attachments to Office of Special Operations DB reports, referenced by memorandum from AD/OSO to AD/ORE, were being submitted directly to the Department of the Army for retention or loan to interested agencies. ORE was requested by AD/OSO to evaluate this material and to indicate if similar materials were being received by other channels. One component of CIA was therefore requesting determina-

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but causing them to resort to additional work in requesting this material from a third party.

Solution

AD/ORE discussed this problem with AD/OSO. Procedures for handling the group of SO-DB Reports mentioned above have been clarified. Efforts will be made to have future material of this nature disseminated to Map Division for evaluation and retention.

(e) Problem

Inter-Library materials requested by Procurement Section have in many instances been borrowed on a short term loan basis. Reproduction Branch, Services Division, had no method of separation of this material from the balance of that requested by Procurement Section. This resulted in over-due documents of the lending agencies and subsequent embarrassment when these materials were recalled.

Solution

Management Staff discussion with Chief, Reproduction Branch, Services Division, resolved this problem by having Procurement Section indicate on reproduction requisition "Inter-Library Loan" and these materials will be given first priority by Reproduction.

(f) Problem

The reproduction workload resulting from requirements for copies of maps attached to or included in reports has been increasing during the last six months, much of this material is reproducible by "Thermo-Fax".

Solution

Recommended by the Management Staff and concurred in by the Chief, Procurement and Reference Branch, that one "Thermo-Fax" be procured for use by the Branch to ease the reproduction workload.

c. Reference Section

(1) The Reference Section furnishes map reference services to CIA, IAC Agencies and other agencies of the Government.

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(2) Full utilization is made of the catalog card files by this Section in the determination of materials best suited to fulfill specific requests.

(3) Requester requirements vary greatly and in many instances reference personnel recommend and determine best available materials in accordance with need.

(4) Foreign Service Personnel, State Department, enroute overseas, are supplied with basic maps in accordance with their position and the area to which assigned.

(5) Requests from individuals must be adjudicated in light of requester need and classification of pertinent material, questions arising with regard to advisability of dissemination are resolved by Chief, Procurement and Reference Branch.

(6) Nearly all Department of State map reference materials (reference atlases, gazetteers, postal guides, pilots map supplements, map catalogs, foreign language dictionaries, etc.) formerly loaned on an indefinite basis to CIA have been officially transferred to this Agency.

d. Processing Section

(1) The Processing Section has the basic responsibility for integration, by regional geographic areas, of materials into the map holdings and the distribution of materials as needed or requested.

(2) The present catalog procedure has been operating for considerable time, and while considered adequate during the early stages of this operation does not meet with the present workload requirements.

A comparison of the present and recommended procedures is attached as Exhibit "E". The simplification, economy and conservation of time plus the ability of putting catalog card dissemination on a current basis will assist this Section in the reduction of current backlog of uncataloged materials. Revised list for the dissemination of map catalog cards is attached as Exhibit "F".

The recommended procedure has been discussed between the Management Staff and the Chief, Procurement and Reference Branch, and agreed as a logical and workable procedure.

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(3) The Management Staff recommends and the Chief, Procurement and Reference Branch, concurs in the transfer of the Circulation Librarian, GS-5, from the Office of the Chief to the Processing Section.

(4) Certain simplifications and eliminations of files and file procedures recommended during the course of the survey have been implemented in this Section.

(5) The problem of inclusion of specific map holdings within the Central Intelligence Agency Disaster Plan was discussed with DAD/OCD, Chairman of this committee. Facilities will be afforded for a limited number of currently maintained maps and map materials located outside the Washington area.

(6) The Processing Section is responsible for the preparation of a weekly coordinated "Acquisitions List for Maps of Foreign Areas", present distribution of 175 copies has been revised as attached in Exhibit "G".

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